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ARTICLES
A Genealogy of
Programmatic Stop and Frisk:
The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit
FRANK RUDY COOPER*
President Trump has called for increased use of the recently predominant policing methodology known as programmatic stop and frisk. This Article contributes to the field
by identifying, defining, and discussing five key components
of the practice: (1) administratively dictated (2) pervasive
Terry v. Ohio stops and frisks (3) aimed at crime prevention
by means of (4) data-enhanced profiles of suspects that (5)
target young racial minority men.
Whereas some scholars see programmatic stop and frisk
as solely the product of individual police officer bias, this
Article argues for understanding how we arrived at specific
police practices by analyzing three levels of social activity:
(1) the macro level of analysis is that of broad social discourses, (2) the meso level involves both criminal procedure
doctrines and criminological policy advocacy, and (3) the
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micro level is where police departments engage in specific
practices.
This new methodology, which explores what I have
named the “discourse-to-practice-circuit,” allows us to conduct a genealogy of how and why programmatic stop and
frisk became a predominant practice. At the macro level, the
late 1960s discourse calling for law and order linked backlash against civil rights to crime control. Meso-level legal
discourses, such as the general weakening of Terry doctrine
and Whren v. United States pretext doctrine’s insulation of
police officers’ racist motivations, allowed for more aggressive policing. Simultaneously, a meso-level backlash version
of criminology, exemplified by James Q. Wilson’s call for
fixing broken windows, influenced public policy. At the micro level, police departments increasingly took advantage of
the doctrinal weaknesses by adapting the methodologies of
backlash criminologists in the form of programmatic stop
and frisk.
In light of that genealogy, this Article argues for challenging programmatic stop and frisk with counter-narratives that make promoting equality a primary goal of policing. For instance, the discourse supporting Whren doctrine
contends that we should refuse to suppress evidence discovered when searches are based on racist motivations in order
to avoid second guessing officers’ split-second decisions.
This Article notes that such pretext searches are at least educated guesses based on a fair probability the particular
suspect is involved in crime. However, programmatic stops
and frisks are based only on specific and articulable facts, if
not mere stereotypes. A counter-discourse at the meso level
would thus contend that Whren doctrine should not be extended to programmatic stops and frisks because such stops
and frisks are, unlike pretext searches, merely uneducated
guesses. Future scholarship should consider the discourseto-practice-circuit in other contexts.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 4
I. THE PROBLEM: PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK .................. 12
A. Components of Programmatic Stop and Frisk ................. 14
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INTRODUCTION
When the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) choked Eric
Garner to death, it was widely seen as an example of police brutality.1 In fact, it reveals a larger problem: systematic harassment of
young racial minority men2 in cities3 through the practice known as

1

See MATT TAIBBI, I CAN’T BREATHE: A KILLING ON BAY STREET 112–15,
118–22 (2017) (detailing the police killing of Eric Garner).
2
It is mostly men who are stopping and frisking other men; hence, we must
consider how masculinities affect both police targeting and civilian responses.
See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry
Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 675–76 (2009) [hereinafter Cooper, Who’s the Man?] (applying masculinities studies to Terry stops
and frisks); Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW.
L.J. 221, 242–62 (2015) (applying masculinities studies to police violence against
men of color); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial
Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 131–35 (2014) (applying masculinities
studies to psychological study of police violence). Many scholars continue to ignore masculinity when discussing racial profiling. See generally POLICING THE
BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT (Angela J. Davis ed.,
2017) [hereinafter POLICING THE BLACK MAN] (collecting race-focused essays).
3
See Frank Rudy Cooper, Hyper-incarceration As a Multidimensional Attack: Replying to Angela Harris Through The Wire, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
67, 70–71 (2011) (discussing the intersection of geography and hyper-incarceration).
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“programmatic stop and frisk.”4 We need to understand the programmatic use of Terry v. Ohio5 stops and frisks because they are
the predominant form of policing in urban communities.6 This Article is the first to create a systematic analysis of the components of

4

Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and
Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1505
(2014) (acknowledging that the Broken Windows theory “created the conditions
under which stop and frisk would eventually thrive”). But see Andrew Ingram,
Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Maintenance Policing, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 151 (2014) (contending Wilson’s
Broken Windows theory actually undermines rationale for the order maintenance
policing methodologies that grew out of it). For further discussion and elaboration
on the Broken Windows theory, see infra Section III.C.1.
This Article defines “programmatic stop and frisk” as administratively compelled, frequent, and profile-based targeting of young black and Latinx men for
purposes of crime prevention. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein,
Redefining What’s Reasonable: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 281, 286–87 (2016) (“[M]any of the searches policing officials engage in
today are suspicion-less. This is the hallmark of programmatic, or deterrent,
searches. They are not aimed at a suspect but at a broad body of the people––
perhaps all of us––to prevent even the contemplation of offending.”); Tracey L.
Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-andFrisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162–63 (2016) (defining programmatic stop and frisk). See generally David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 77, 80 (2018) (citing
programmatic stop and frisk as a reason for changing Fourth Amendment standing
requirements); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating
Stop-and-Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2440–
43 (2017) (arguing programmatic stop and frisk reinforces racial stratification).
The American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Policing Project’s latest draft report
defines programmatic searches and seizures as those that are typically suspicionless, like administrative searches, roadblocks, and much of the surveillance done
by modern technology. See Policing Project: Proposed Table of Contents, A.L.I.
ADVISER, http://www.thealiadviser.org/policing/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). The
danger of the ALI’s definition of programmatic stop and frisk is that it renders
invisible technically valid, but racially selective and thus immoral, stops and
frisks.
5
392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under Terry doctrine, “stops” are temporary and limited
seizures and “frisks” are limited searches of the outside of the person for weapons.
See id. at 30.
6
The scholarly literature has recently come to this conclusion. See, e.g.,
Huq, supra note 4, at 2398 (declaring “[stop, question, and frisk] likely became
the modal form of police-citizen contact for many urban residents”); see also Goel
et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM.

6

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

the practice. It argues that programmatic stop and frisk is best defined as (1) administratively driven,7 (2) pervasive, (3) data-enhanced area profiling,8 using the Terry stop and frisk power, for (4)
race-, gender-, and age-targeted9 police seizure and search of civilians with (5) the purpose of crime prevention. Given President
Trump’s calls for the increased use of programmatic stops and

L. REV. 181, 219 (2017) (“At least in major metropolitan areas, stop-and-frisks
typically are carried out pursuant to organized policies and programs . . . .”).
7
See e.g., Bellin, supra note 4, at 1502 (suggesting police officers are stopping and frisking in response to administratively created incentives); Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 62 (2015) (supporting the contention that administrators pressure officers to increase stops and frisks of certain
populations).
8
Police departments have increasingly used “big data” to target policing. Big
data describes a variety of ways of parsing large sets of information. See Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock The Potential of Big Data
in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 952 (2016) [hereinafter Quantifying Criminal Procedure] (“‘Big data’ is the practice of accumulating extraordinarily large amounts of information from a variety of different
sources and then processing that information using statistical analysis.”); see also
Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 125–30 (2012)
(exploring how big data can produce police reform); Goel et al., supra note 6, at
182 (discussing how police “access to exponentially increasing amounts of information, and methods of processing and analyzing vast sets of data” will affect
policing); Elizabeth Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion,
Big Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 22–27 (2016) (describing
police use of big data). For work on Compstat and the Fourth Amendment, see
generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 29, 72 (2017) (discussing implications of data-based policing).
9
For discussions of race and gender in Terry stops, see Cooper, Who’s the
Man?, supra note 2, at 702–26 (applying masculinities studies to Terry stops);
Eric J. Miller, Police Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 735, 752–57 (2015) (considering race-gender effects on police stops); Richardson & Goff, supra note 2, at 136–42 (studying link between masculinities and
police violence). While the programmatic profiles generally target young men of
color, women of color are sometimes targeted by the practice and sometimes especially vulnerable to sexual harassment because of the discretion that programmatic stop and frisk invests in police officers. A 2010 Cato Institute report found
that sexual misconduct was the second most common type of police misconduct.
NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT, CATO INST., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT (2010).
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frisks,10 now is the time to analyze the practice and consider potential responses.
Scholars have tended to explain programmatic stop and frisk as
the product of either efficient use of police resources11 or biased
analyses of suspiciousness. 12 This Article proposes a discourse-to-

10

Trump has often claimed that he will increase the use of programmatic stop
and frisk. See Michael Barbaro, Maggie Haberman & Yamiche Alcindor, Donald
Trump Embraces Wider Use of Stop-and-Frisk by Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/politics/donald-trump-don-kingblack-voters.html; Lauren Carroll, Donald Trump and Lester Holt Clash Over
Whether Stop-and-Frisk is Constitutional in New York, POLITIFACT (Sept. 28,
2016, 4:20 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/
sep/28/donald-trump/debate-donald-trump-says-stop-and-frisk-constituti/; Deb
Riechmann & Michael Tarm, President Trump Calls on Chicago to Embrace
Stop-and-Frisk Policing to Curb Violence, T IME (Oct. 9, 2018), http://time.
com/5419157/donald-trump-chicago-stop-and-frisk/ (reporting on Trump’s very
recent call for more use of the practice); see also Reshaad Shirazi, It's High Time
to Dump the High-Crime Area Factor, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 76, 104 (2016)
(discussing Trump comments). Trump called for increased use of stop and frisk
during the general election campaign. See Trump: Bring Back ‘Stop-And-Frisk,’
CNN (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2016/09/22/trump-takeson-race-and-policing-lead-murray-dnt.cnn (reporting Trump references to NYPD
stop and frisk).
11
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S
LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 147 (2012) (discussing New York
City’s police administrators’ belief that programmatic stop and frisk significantly
helped New York City’s crime drop); Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot
Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 41
JUST. Q. 633, 658 (2014) (asserting hot spot policing worked); Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Stop Police Violence, 48 URB. LAW. 675, 706–13
(2016) (reviewing literature on efficacy of programmatic stop and frisk and calling for narrowing it to hot spots policing); David Weisburd et al., Do Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices Deter Crime?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. POL’Y 31,
46–47 (2016) (contending that an aggressive stop and frisk intervention produces
a crime drop).
The supposition that programmatic stop and frisk reduces crime derives from
the Giuliani/Bloomberg era in New York City, when the NYPD accomplished a
large crime reduction from the mid-1990s to 2010. See Bellin, supra note 4, at
1503–18.
12
For examples of the bias-based critique, see, for example, Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 164–67
(2013) (arguing implicit bias drives police hyper-suspicion of racial minorities);
Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police
Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 183–85 (2016) (discussing how ra-
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practice-circuit as a means of understanding how we end up with
particular police practices. Drawing on literature from the field of
cultural studies, it proposes looking at how discourses move through
three levels of social interaction.13 Discourses are narratives seeking
cial insecurity could lead to police violence); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2037–39, 2053 (2011)
[hereinafter Arrest Efficiency] (contending implicit bias explains arrest rates).
Meares writes that, “Floyd[v. City of New York] lays bare the reality of urban
policing: stop-and-frisk is carried out systematically, deliberately, and with great
frequency.” Meares, supra note 4, at 164; see also David Rudovsky & Lawrence
Rosenthal, Debate: The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2013) (point-counterpoint on programmatic stop and frisk);
Kami Chavis Simmons, The Legacy of Stop and Frisk: Addressing the Vestiges of
a Violent Police Culture, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 865–68 (2014) (critiquing programmatic use of racial profiling in stop and frisk). The proposal to do
‘race audits’ of new policing technology is the most likely the best strategy to
head off implicit bias that might lead to new rounds of racial targeting. See I.
Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1276
n.215 (2017) (discussing potentially helpful technologies that may be used to reduce hyper-suspicion of racial minorities).
Policing programs are a new phenomena that stem from earlier practices.
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON
CRIME AND COMMUNITIES 303 (2018). Hence, influential criminal procedure
scholar Christopher Slobogin refers to a related group of “panvasive” Fourth
Amendment intrusions that may sometimes be thought to include programmatic
stop and frisk:
Panvasive searches and seizures, . . . are something quite different. . . . Examples of panvasive actions include residential and
business inspection programs, checkpoints (aimed at detecting,
inter alia, illegal immigration, drunken drivers, or drivers without licenses), drug testing programs, creation of DNA databases, collection of communications metadata, and establishment of surveillance regimes involving cameras, tracking systems, and the like.
Chistopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 93
(2016) (proposing regulation of police under an administrative model); cf. Daphna
Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1039, 1042 (2016) (noting that “[w]hile our Fourth Amendment framework is
transactional, then, surveillance is increasingly programmatic.”).
13
A discourse is a narrative about a topic. As cultural studies scholar Stuart
Hall said, a discourse
influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate
the conduct of others. Just as a discourse ‘rules in’ certain ways
of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible
way to talk, write, or conduct oneself, so also, by definition, it
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to become the consensus on a topic.14 The macro level is where
broad cultural and political discourses seek to capture the popular
understanding of how the world does, or should, operate.15 At the
meso level, broad discourses are elaborated upon as discipline-specific discourses, such as legal doctrines or criminology.16 The micro
level sees discipline-specific discourses translated into policing policies, both officially and in practice.17 This is the discourse-to-practice-circuit.
Using this approach allows us to conduct a genealogy of programmatic stop and frisk.18 At the macro level, the “law and order”
‘rules out’, limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing
knowledge about it.
Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation, in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 13, 44 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997).
Herein, the primary discourse discussed is the call for “law and order,” which
began with the Barry Goldwater Presidential campaign in 1964 and was then
taken up by President Nixon in his 1968 Presidential campaign. MICHAEL W.
FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S, at 3 (2007) (defining law and order narrative). Ronald
Reagan had adopted the law and order discourse to great effect in the 1966 California Gubernatorial campaign and went on to promote a War on Drugs as President in 1982. Id. at 11 (discussing Reagan’s use of crime as wedge issue). For
further discussion on “law and order,” see infra Parts II, III.
14
See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND
THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 226–27 (1998).
15
We can often identify three basic levels of social phenomena: macro, meso,
and micro. See id. at 226 (adapting “standard sociological categories of macro-,
meso-, and micro-levels of social organization” to black women’s experiences).
Approaching social organization from the point of view of policing leads to defining the macro level as that at which society-wide narratives about law are created. See infra Section II.B.1. The macro level seeks to influence the meso level,
at which social rules are created through legal doctrine. See infra Section II.B.2.
The meso level then seeks to influence the micro level, at which police officers
interact with civilians. See infra Section II.B.3. While Collins is correct that “all
of these levels work together recursively,” the hierarchical relations in law mean
that dominant narratives about what justice requires should influence doctrine
more than actual police officer behaviors influence doctrine. COLLINS, supra note
14, at 227.
16
See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 14, at 227.
17
See, e.g., id.
18
This use of genealogical methodology does not follow every tenet of philosopher Michel Foucault’s approach. Richard A. Jones, Philosophical Methodologies of Critical Race Theory, 1 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 17,
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discourse of the late 1960s responded to the backlash against the
1960s civil rights movements by arguing for heightened crime control.19 At the meso level, an increasingly conservative United States
Supreme Court weakened Terry doctrine.20 Also at the meso level,
backlash criminologists, such as James Q. Wilson,21 created aggressive policing methodologies.22 At the micro level, in the early 2000s,
New York City proponents of aggressive policing developed practices that encouraged using big data to dictate pervasive stops and
frisks seeking crime prevention by targeting black and Latinx men.23
23 (2008) (identifying “five genealogical methodologies—reversal, marginality,
discontinuity, materiality, and specificity—derived from Nietzsche by Foucault”).
Part III of this Article does provide a post-structuralist critique by means of connecting ideological discourses—the call for “law and order” and backlash criminology—to police practices. See infra Part III.
19
See FLAMM, supra note 13, at 2–3, 52–66.
20
Among the most notable ways the Court gutted Terry was by allowing an
allegation that activity occurred in a “high crime area” to be a key factor in reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000)
(allowing stops when a person in a “high-crime area” flees at the sight of police).
21
See infra Section III.B.2 (connecting Wilson’s theories to cultural backlash). On Wilson’s impact, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Private Norms and Public
Spaces, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183, 187–89 (2009) (discussing influence
of Broken Windows); Franklin E. Zimring, Will Success Spoil James Q. Wilson?,
85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 828, 831 (1995) (reviewing CRIME (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995)) (“Those who called for expanding imprisonment in the United States twenty years ago should consider themselves successful
advocates.”). For a critique of Wilson, see Glenn C. Loury, Much to Answer For,
BOSTON R. May/June 2012, at 48, 48 (arguing that Wilson “provide[d] academic
justification” for mass incarceration).
22
One such theory analogizes low-level offenses to broken windows in a
neighborhood. Such offenses are said to encourage more serious crimes by suggesting that no one cares about rule breaking. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/. For background information on
post-civil rights backlash, see generally Anthony Cook, The Ghosts of 1964:
Race, Reagan, and the Neo-Conservative Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement,
6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 81, 82–83 (2015) (applying discursive analysis to
post-civil rights backlash); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 853, 858 (2006) [hereinafter Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity] (defining “post-civil rights anxiety”).
23
See Goel et al., supra note 6, at 186–88. There is a lively debate over
whether to use the new term “Latinx” or something more accepted, like “Latina/o”
or “Hispanic.” This Article chooses the newer term to emphasize the increasing
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If we are to end such use of programmatic stop and frisk by police, which amounts to racial harassment,24 we must rework the discourses supporting it from the macro level down. This Article provides an example of the work that must be done in legal doctrine.
Assuming arguendo that Whren v. United States correctly refused
to consider evidence of race-based pretext when an ordinary search
or seizure is supported by probable cause,25 what about programmatic stops and frisks? Stops and frisks are justified based on mere
reasonable suspicion.26 Whereas the Whren rule suggests that police
officers should not be second-guessed, a counter-discourse would
importance of nonconforming gender/sex orientation identities. See Tanisha Love
Ramirez & Zeba Blay, Why People Are Using the Term ‘Latinx,’ HUFFINGTON
POST (July 5, 2016, 5:33 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-people-are-using-the-term-latinx_us_57753328e4b0cc0fa136a159 (“Latinx in general is a way to be more inclusive of identities that go beyond the everyday gender
and racial norms that are rapidly shifting and being redefined in today’s culture.”).
But see Hugo Marín González, Why I Choose to Not Be Latinx, LATINO REBELS
(July 20, 2017, 11:44 AM), http://www.latinorebels.com/2017/07/20/why-ichose-to-not-be-latinx/ (“To be Latinx, just like Latino, Latina, or Hispanic, is to
make invisible the African and the Taíno in me.”).
24
The literature criticizing the programmatic nature of contemporary usage
of stop and frisk is growing. See Robert Apel, On the Deterrent Effects of Stop,
Question, and Frisk, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 27, 62–64 (2016) (calling
for study of programmatic stop and frisk’s alleged deterrent effect); Bellin, supra
note 4, at 1501 (referring to NYPD’s “stop and frisk” program); Friedman &
Stein, supra note 4, at 286–87 (noting broad scope of programmatic stop and
frisk); Arthur H. Garrison, NYPD Stop and Frisk, Perceptions of Criminals, Race
and the Meaning of Terry v. Ohio: A Content Analysis of Floyd v. City of New
York, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 65, 83 (2014) (describing NYPD’s myopic
focus on high-crime racial minority areas); Goel et al., supra note 6, at 187 (arguing big data can make courts more comfortable relying on evidence of discrimination); Kent Greenawalt, Probabilities, Perceptions, Consequences and “Discrimination”: One Puzzle About Controversial “Stop and Frisk,” 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 181, 184 (2014) (critiquing racial profiling as immoral); Meares, supra
note 4, at 164 (defining “programmatic stop-and-frisk”).
25
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (allowing almost all pretextual police intrusions based on probable cause). Probable cause is required for
most searches and seizures. See, e.g., id. Probable cause is a “fair probability” that
crime is afoot and that the person to be searched or seized is involved. Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
26
This is the standard for, inter alia, Terry stops and frisks. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). It is defined as the ability to state “specific and articulable
facts” leading a reasonable officer to conclude that crime is afoot and that the
person to be searched or seized is involved. Id. at 21.
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say that only police officers’ educated guesses—those based on
probable cause—should be insulated from scrutiny for pretext.27 Because stops and frisks are uneducated guesses, the trend of extending
the Whren rule to stops and frisks should be reversed.28
Part I of this Article delineates the components of programmatic
stop and frisk and summarizes the ways the practice marginalizes
young black and Latinx men. Part II critically reviews scholarship
analyzing programmatic stop and frisk, then sketches the tripartite
approach recommended by this Article. Part III’s genealogy of programmatic stop and frisk shows how macro-level discourses calling
for “law and order” translated into meso-level weakening of Terry
doctrine and a meso-level backlash criminology, which then translated into micro-level programmatic stop and frisk practices.29 Part
IV contends that scholars should create equality-based counter-narratives at the macro and meso levels to the call for “law and order.”
As an example, it proposes an argument for reversing Whren’s extension into Terry doctrine. Part V concludes.
I. THE PROBLEM: PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK
When the Terry Court considered whether to allow police officers to make stops and frisks on less than probable cause a half century ago in 1968, the National Association for the Advancement of

27

See infra Section IV.B.
Id.
29
See Jennifer E. Laurin, Terry, Timeless and Time-Bound, 15 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2017) (decrying “all-too-common legal academic trap of centering
the importance of judicial decision-making at the expense of grappling with the
far messier and more contingent political, sociological, and institutional forces
that enter the mix”); cf. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 103–05 (2001) (considering
how discourses about the need for crime control brought about mass incarceration). See also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR
ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR 77, 91–96 (2007) (noting use of crime control discourse for political purposes); LOÏC WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY 9–11 (2009) [hereinafter
WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY] (arguing a network of conservative think
tanks created a discourse dismantling the welfare state by means of mass incarceration).
28
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Colored People (“NAACP”)30 argued that it would lead to widespread harassment of blacks.31 That prediction has come true. In the
2013 Floyd v. City of New York32 trial, plaintiff-activists proved that
the NYPD had targeted young black and Latinx men for aggressive
use of Terry stops and frisks.33 Likewise, a 2017 report on stop and
frisk in Philadelphia found that race, not crime-rate, best explained
police targeting.34 Results in Baltimore were similar.35
Legal scholars have only recently identified and analyzed programmatic stop and frisk. Professor Tracey Meares published an important essay discussing the emerging phenomenon of programmatic stop and frisk in 2016.36 Law and public health scholar Jeffrey
Fagan and others had earlier conducted extensive research on order
maintenance policing by means of stop and frisk in New York
City.37 This Part of the Article sets up the new scholarly approach
introduced and explained in Part II, as well as the genealogy of pro-

30
The NAACP is the largest and most prominent civil rights organization
focusing on African-Americans. See Nation’s Premier Civil Rights Organization,
NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/nations-premier-civil-rights-organization/ (last
visited Sept. 8, 2018).
31
See Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as
Amicus Curiae at 31–35, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67); see also
Terry, 392 U.S. at 11–12 (identifying NAACP argument).
32
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y.) (concluding that NYPD’s programmatic
stop and frisk practices violated Terry doctrine and Equal Protection doctrine),
appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
33
See id. at 562 (summarizing holdings); Goel et al., supra note 6, at 187–88
(discussing stop hit-rates of Terry stops in New York City).
34
See Lance Hannon, An Explanatory Multilevel Analysis of Pedestrian
Frisks in Philadelphia, RACE & JUST. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11–19)
(https://doi.org/10.1177/2153368717730106); Samantha Melamed, Study: High
Rates of Stop-and-Frisk Even in Philly’s Lowest-Crime Black Areas, INQUIRER
(Oct. 2, 2017, 12:32 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/stop-friskpolicing-philadelphia-racial-bias-lance-hannon-villanova-20171002.html
(reporting on Lance Hannon study).
35
See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 29 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download (connecting stops to race).
36
See generally Meares, supra note 4.
37
See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 463
(2000); Fagan & Geller, supra note 7, at 68–85.
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grammatic stop and frisk conducted in Part III, by first carefully describing the components and consequences of programmatic stop
and frisk.
A. Components of Programmatic Stop and Frisk
This Section brings together varied scholarly descriptions of programmatic stop and frisk to define the breadth of the phenomenon.
Moreover, this Section contributes to stop and frisk scholarship by
identifying elements of programmatic stop and frisk that have only
been discussed in part by other sources.
1. ADMINISTRATIVE DICTATION
The first key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is topdown requirements or incentives for aggressive use of stop and frisk.
Today, Terry stops are “scripted, predictable, and deeply institutionalized.”38 Programmatic stop and frisk is distinguished from a collection of Terry stops and frisks because programmatic stops and
frisks are administratively dictated.39 Meares labels these actions
“exogenous”—forced from above—rather than “endogenous”—naturally occurring.40 This is a problem because the Terry decision envisioned endogenous stops and frisks.41
Exogenous stops and frisks are also a problem because they
amount to state ordered harassment of civilians.42 Police departments have been accused of setting mandatory minimums for stops
and frisks in a given area.43 Police departments have also incentivized programmatic stops and frisks by tying promotions to getting
38

CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE
AND CITIZENSHIP 36 (2014).
39

Meares, supra note 4, at 162.
See id. at 162–63 (“The stops that flow from these programs are not individual incidents that grow organically—endogenously—out of a collection of individual investigations occurring between an officer and a person that the officer
believes to be committing a crime. Rather, programmatic stops are imposed from
the top down and are exogenous to the fabric of community-police relations.”).
41
Id. at 163.
42
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556–57
(S.D.N.Y.) appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
43
See Alexander H. Kipperman, Comment, Frisky Business: Mitigating Predictive Crime Software’s Facilitation of Unlawful Stops and Frisks, 24 TEMP. POL.
& C.R.L. REV. 215, 236 (2014) (citing ex-police officer’s testimony).
40
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“results,” as measured by more stops and frisks.44 In other words,
stops and frisks are on the rise because police administrators are demanding more of them.45
The top-down nature of programmatic stop and frisk has been
greatly facilitated by the development of crime statistic mapping
programs, known as Compstat.46 Compstat enables police administrators to track crimes by precinct and neighborhood.47 As a result,
administrators can pressure street officers to direct more energy,
read as more frequent stops and frisks, to particular areas.48 Other
forms of “big data” can be put to similar uses.49 In a nutshell, “‘[b]ig
data’ is the practice of accumulating extraordinarily large amounts
of information from a variety of different sources and then processing that information using statistical analysis.”50 Use of big data
to select target areas (or even individual targets) allows for administrative dictation of programmatic stops and frisks.51

44

See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1502 (suggesting police officers are stopping
and frisking in response to incentives).
45
See id. at 1502.
46
See id. at 1506. One of the preeminent scholar on technology and the Fourth
Amendment is Orin Kerr. See generally Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 801, 806 (2004). For work on Compstat and the Fourth Amendment, see
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62
EMORY L.J. 259, 323 (2012) (suggesting Compstat produced New York City’s
crime drop); Joh, supra note 8, at 22–27 (describing police use of big data).
47
Bellin, supra note 4, at 1506.
48
See, e.g., Fagan & Geller, supra note 7, at 62 (supporting contention administrators pressure officers to increase stops and frisks of certain populations).
49
See, e.g., Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 46, at 323 (discussing
Compstat); Goel et al., supra note 6, at 182 (discussing big data in general); Joh,
supra note 8, at 22–27 (considering effects of big data on policing).
50
Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 952. Other uses of the
term big data refer to particular complex algorithms. See Gil Press, 12 Big Data
Definitions: What’s Yours?, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2014, 8:01 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2014/09/03/12-big-data-definitionswhats-yours/#f8403ec13ae8 (discussing uses of term).
51
Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 953–54 (noting that law
enforcement is already using big data “to determine where crime is likely to occur
and to allocate their resources accordingly”).
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2. PERVASIVENESS
The second key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is
its pervasiveness, which entails the aggressive use of the Terry stop
and frisk power. The blanketing of certain neighborhoods is said to
be necessary for the program to have its alleged deterrent effect.52
The theory is that if potential felons know they are very likely to get
Terry stopped, they will leave their guns at home.53 If they then get
into a conflict, they will not have a weapon with which to make it
deadly.54 However, in order to convince these felons-in-waiting that
they will get stopped, police officers must more or less arbitrarily
stop them.55 The deterrent effect depends on the arbitrariness and,
thus, the likely unconstitutionality of the stops.56 The belief in the
necessity of saturating certain neighborhoods with arbitrary stops
makes it especially likely that programmatic stops and frisks will
remain frequent, at least for particular populations.57
The pervasiveness of programmatic stops and frisks alone raises
three concerns. First, such pervasive use of stops and frisks is not
what the Terry Court anticipated.58 Second, it is particularly troubling that the theory of programmatic stop and frisk requires frequent harassment of a circumscribed set of people in order for the
deterrent to be effective.59 Third, the frequency of the stops and their
52

See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1538 (“[T]he likelihood of a frisk determines
the deterrent effect.”). See generally Apel, supra note 24 (calling for study of programmatic stop and frisk’s alleged deterrent effect). But see generally Fagan &
Geller, supra note 7, at 84 (expressing doubt about measurability of deterrent effect of Terry stops).
53
Bellin, supra note 4, at 1515 (identifying goal of “instilling concern in
youths that they could be stopped and frisked every time they leave their homes
so they are less likely to carry weapons.”).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1538.
56
See id. at 1538–39, 1548.
57
Id. at 1549.
58
See Meares, supra note 4, at 178; see also Michael D. White et al., Federal
Civil Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City,
14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 14 (2016) (noting frequency of stops of racial minorities in Newark, New Jersey, “Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; Miami Gardens, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania”).
59
See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556–57 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
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low hit-rate implies that the unconstitutionality of the stops is necessary to their supposed deterrent effect.60
3. PROFILES OF AREAS
The third key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is
that it is profile-based.61 Administratively impelled, pervasive stops
and frisks would be problematic themselves, but because they are
entwined with racial profiling they have spurred strong resistance.62
Profiles of criminals have been around for well over three decades.63
Profiles have also long been criticized as devolving into racial stereotypes.64 The scholarly literature highlights concerns about the devolution of characteristics like “unusual clothing” or “furtive movements”65 into “things people of color wear” and “how people of
color react to the presence of the police.”66

60
Bellin, supra note 4, at 1548; see also Arrest Efficiency, supra note 12, at
2037 (defining “hit rate” as rate of finding evidence of contraband during stops).
The hit-rate is the percentage of times a stop yields evidence of a crime.
61
See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 93 (defining programmatic stop and frisk
as involving profiling).
62
See Frank Rudy Cooper, Understanding ‘De-policing’: Symbiosis Theory
and Critical Cultural Theory, 71 UMKC L. REV. 355, 361 (2002) [hereinafter
Cooper, Understanding ‘De-policing’].
63
See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989) (allowing
stops based on profiles where the stops could also be otherwise justified).
64
See, e.g., id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing “the profile’s ‘chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations’” (quoting
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 1
(1989))).
65
Goel et al., supra note 6, at 188 (contending that dispensing with “furtive
movements” as stop justification would make them “less discriminatory and more
successful”).
66
See Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135,
136 (2002) (noting ease of claiming misnomer “high-crime area” based on characteristics of “high-crime people”); see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 (allowing
profiling); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (making flight from police in “high-crime area” a basis for reasonable suspicion). But see Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 343 (Mass. 2016) (declaring that racial profiling
makes it impossible to know that a black man evading police is doing so for suspicious reasons).
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Local police force use of Compstat and big data to target stops
and frisks is relatively new.67 Departments now profile neighborhoods as “high crime” based on arrest statistics.68 They also profile
suspect behaviors.69 The statistical analysis, combined with preexisting stereotypes, enables and encourages racial profiling.70 Hence,
the Floyd court found as fact that the aforementioned NYPD policy
of assigning officers to specific areas and instructing them to stop
the “right people” was understood to direct racial profiling of young
black and Latinx males.71
4. TARGETING BY RACE, GENDER, AND AGE
The fourth key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is
further micro-targeting of young black and Latinx males in urban
environments. The combination of minimal constitutional scrutiny
and great administrator demand for stops and frisks means police
officers cannot avoid intervening in the lives of certain civilians.72
Resource scarcity virtually requires that police focus on sub-groups,
usually young men of color.73 That is, because the police can’t stop

67

Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 950 (discussing “modern
methods of data collection” as opposed to older law enforcement techniques).
68
See, e.g., Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1602–
03 (2014) (analyzing “[t]he use of historical arrest statistics for targeted law enforcement efforts”).
69
See Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 963 (discussing the
use and meaning of “furtive movements” in ascertaining potential criminal activity).
70
See Finch & Tene, supra note 68, at 1602–03 (worrying big data may hide
explicit discrimination and lead to disparate racial impacts); cf. Goel et al., supra
note 6, at 220–21 (describing that big data could be used to improve fairness of
stop and frisk).
71
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562, 603 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
72
Fagan & Geller, supra note 7, at 54.
73
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1500 (arguing “inescapable resource constraints
dictate reliance on demographic profiles, including (impermissibly) race, to narrow the program’s scope”); Meares, supra note 4, at 178 (noting police focus on
racial minorities); cf. Carbado & Rock, supra note 12, at 167 (identifying racial
profiling as a factor in police violence).
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everyone, they must focus on sub-groups.74 This leads them to profile the characteristics they think indicate suspiciousness—namely,
being young, male, and black or Latinx.75
Of course, racial targeting is a self-confirming rationale because
police officers’ own behavior controls the arrest statistics.76 If police
officers are especially likely to arrest racial minorities, the arrest statistics will then support further racial targeting.77 This is a problem
because police officers’ implicit bias against racial minorities necessarily influences the suspect selection process.78 And many police
officers also have an explicit bias that racial minorities are more
crime prone.79 Since racial profiling is tautological, it is likely to increase over time.
Programmatic stop and frisk targeting also incorporates gender.
For example, young men of color are deemed to be more crime
prone.80 As a result, urban police forces focus on young men of
color.81 Furthermore, the mostly male police force is more likely to
provoke, and be provoked by, young men.82 Meanwhile, United
States Customs officials focus scrutiny on black women.83
74

Bellin, supra note 4, at 1542.
Id. at 1500, 1542.
76
See Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 188 (“If the police overestimate the dangerousness of members of a race, and concentrate enforcement efforts on them,
the ensuing statistics about crimes will not accurately reflect how many crimes
were actually committed by members of various races.”).
77
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562, 667 (S.D.N.Y.)
(“Given the NYPD’s policy of basing stops on crime data, these races may then
be subjected to even more stops and enforcement, resulting in a self-perpetuating
cycle.”), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
78
L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND.
L.J. 1143, 1161–64 (2012) [hereinafter Police Efficiency].
79
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1543.
80
See NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR 20–25 (2018) (documenting criminalization of black boys from
near birth).
81
See, e.g., Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (defining “the right people” as
“young black and Hispanic men”), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
82
See Cooper, Who’s the Man?, supra note 2, at 675–76 (detailing masculinities studies’ application to Terry stops and frisks); McGinley, Policing and the
Clash of Masculinities, supra note 2, at 242–51 (applying masculinities studies to
police brutality against men of color).
83
See Sherri Sharma, Beyond “Driving While Black” and “Flying While
Brown”: Using Intersectionality to Uncover the Gendered Aspects of Racial Profiling, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 275, 283–85 (2003).
75
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This micro-targeting will likely continue. Programmatic stop
and frisk allegedly has a deterrent effect because police intrusions
are trained upon small, coherent communities.84 Given police officers’ explicit and implicit biases, we should expect administratively
driven, pervasive, profile-based use of the Terry stop and frisk
power to lead to disproportionate and often unconstitutional police
targeting of young racial minority men.85
5. PREVENTATIVE
The final key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is
that it seeks to prevent crime before it occurs. Police administrators
seek to deter crime by using pervasive, profile-based stops and
frisks.86 Administrators predetermine both where and how frequently people will be stopped, which reveals the preventative goal:
administrators send officers to the places they think will be the site
of future crime.87 The attempt to deter crime distinguishes the practice from prior forms of crime fighting.88 Police departments are no
longer satisfied with simply responding to crime by catching and
punishing criminals; instead, their practices focus on preventing
people they profile as “criminals” from even engaging in certain behaviors, such as carrying guns, in the first place.89
Administrators want to supersaturate certain areas with Terry
stops and frisks because they believe that increasing the risk of get-

84

See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1548 (suggesting that targeting of sub-populations is an inevitable consequence of adopting programmatic stop and frisk).
85
Id. at 1542; Meares, supra note 4, at 175 (“[I]n a significant percentage of
cases, police do not comply with the Constitution, and when they do not, the burden falls disproportionately on racial minorities.”).
86
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1515.
87
See id. at 1515–16; Slobogin, supra note 12, at 93 (describing one aspect
of “programmatic searches and seizures” as “seek[ing] to ferret out or deter undetected wrongdoing, usually within a designated group”).
88
See, e.g., Friedman & Stein, supra note 4, at 318 (describing preventative
goal of current policing compared to “investigative” policing); Slobogin, supra
note 12, at 93 (identifying the focus of panvasive searches as deterrence, contra
police practices that “focus on a particular crime known to have already occurred”).
89
See e.g., Bellin, supra note 4, at 1515–16 (noting shift to crime deterrence
goal).
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ting stopped and frisked will make potential felons leave home without their guns.90 They assume that fewer guns means fewer violent
crimes.91 Fewer violent crimes means less public criticism of the police.92 Police departments always want to reduce public criticism, so
they pervasively stop particular populations from carrying guns. By
stopping and frisking certain populations, police departments believe they can prevent those populations from carrying guns and thus
reduce public criticism of their departments. In summary, programmatic stop and frisk can best be understood by connecting the five
key characteristics I have identified: (1) police departments administer (2) pervasive stops and frisks (3) in certain profiled areas and
(4) of certain profiled people to (5) prevent crime and reduce public
criticism of police.
B. Consequences of Programmatic Stop and Frisk
Understanding the elements of programmatic stop and frisk
helps us understand its consequences. Having identified the five key
characteristics of the increasingly prevalent law enforcement practice of programmatic stop and frisk, it is important to understand
why the practice is so problematic. This Section looks at the results
of programmatic stop and frisk in the place where the practice was
invented: New York City. While the evidence of racial profiling
there is troubling, the Section also documents a broader concern: the
use of programmatic stop and frisk as social control of young black
and Latinx males. Programmatic stop and frisk, this Section argues,
represents a powerful majority’s segregation and subordination of a
socially disfavored group.
90

See id. at 1538 (noting rationale for programmatic stop and frisk requires
supersaturation to deter gun carrying); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable
Seizures, 93 DENV. L. REV. 53, 92 (2015) (describing gun deterrence rationale).
This strategy stems from Republican New York City Mayor Rudolph “Rudy”
Giuliani’s hiring of New York City Transit Police Commissioner William Bratton
to utilize James Q. Wilson’s Broken Windows theory to fight crime. Bellin, supra
note 4, at 1503–04. Bratton seized upon statistics linking gun use to violent crime.
Id. at 1507. Deterring gun possession by means of frequent encounters with potential felons became a key goal of the NYPD. Id. at 1508.
91
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1517 (discussing New York City’s identification of “gun crimes as the driver of the City’s violent-crime epidemic”).
92
See id. at 1503 (discussing the “public mood” in New York City in the early
1990s that current violent crime reduction efforts weren’t working).
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1. NYPD RACIAL PROFILING
NYPD racial profiling has long brought together several elements of programmatic stop and frisk. For instance, the existence
of Compstat methods means that NYPD administrators can supersaturate racial minority neighborhoods with stops and frisks on the
assumption that nearly all crime will occur in those neighborhoods.93
Programmatic stop and frisk deployed in conjunction with this type
of big data might thus be thought of as racial “profiling on steroids.”94
The use of racial profiling in Terry stops and frisks was confirmed in New York City. From the mid-1990s through the first decade of the 2000s, the NYPD conducted a reign of terror in which it
systematically and aggressively used its Terry stop and frisk powers
against young men of color.95 Those stops and frisks were clearly
race-based.96
The evidence produced at trial in the Floyd NYPD racial profiling case revealed a pervasive program of only sometimes constitutional stops and frisks.97 The NYPD made over four million stops
between 2004 and 2012.98 Judge Scheindlin found as fact that a
“minimum” of six percent (6%)—over 200,000—of the stops violated the United States Constitution.99 This likely underestimates the
percentage of unconstitutional stops.100
Moreover, the vast majority of the stops amounted to merely hassling people without providing any law enforcement benefit.101 For
instance, only fifty-two percent (52%) of those stopped were

93

See id. at 1506, 1547.
John F. McManus, Profiling on Steroids, in RACIAL PROFILING 46 (Noël
Merino ed., 2015).
95
See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting race-gender of victims), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013); White et al., supra
note 58, at 29–33.
96
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
97
See id. at 560–61.
98
Id. at 556.
99
See id. at 579 (discussing unconstitutional stops).
100
See id. at 578–79 (reviewing expert witness’s methodology for declaring
stops unconstitutional).
101
See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 500 (2015) (referring
to NYPD’s programmatic stop and frisk as hassle).
94
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frisked.102 This is a surprising statistic, given that police officers
generally consider the frisk “an almost incidental facet of” stopping
someone.103 A stop absent a frisk might be a sign that the officer
feels absolutely certain the person they are dealing with poses no
potential danger.104 Moreover, ninety percent (90%) of stops (including frisks) resulted in no further law enforcement action.105 Programmatic stop and frisk thus mostly serves the purpose of putting
particular people on notice that they are subject to frequent, sometimes unlawful, intrusions.
The people who are hassled under programmatic stop and frisk
are overwhelmingly young black and Latinx men.106 The race-based
targeting of NYPD stops was obvious: the City was twenty-three
percent (23%) black, yet a full fifty-two percent (52%) of stops were
of African Americans.107 Latinx people were also overrepresented:
twenty-nine percent (29%) of the City was Latinx, but thirty-one
percent (31%) of stops were of Hispanics.108 Perhaps most glaringly,
the City was thirty-three percent (33%) white, while only ten percent
(10%) of those stopped were white.109 Professor Fagan, the Floyd
plaintiffs’ expert, determined that
the racial composition of a neighborhood is a statistically significant predictor of the number of police
stops even when controlling for police-reported
measures of crime, police-patrol allocations, and
other social conditions in that neighborhood. . . . In
fact, the level of violent crime in an area, somewhat

102

Shira Scheindlin, A Chance to Reflect: Thoughts from the Author of Floyd
v. City of New York, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 35, 38–39 (2017).
103
Seth W. Stoughton, Terry v. Ohio and the (Un)Forgettable Frisk, 15 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 32 (2017) (concluding this is why frisks are “forgettable” to
police officers).
104
Scheindlin, supra note 102, at 39 (“It is likely there never was reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity supporting these stops . . . .”).
105
Id. at 38.
106
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
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Id. at 558–59 (summarizing racial compositions).
108
Id.
109
Id.
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surprisingly, did not make any contribution to explaining the level of stops in high crime areas.110
Accordingly, we know that race does the bulk of the work when departments programmatically stop and frisk.111
One might claim that the NYPD’s racial profiling was explained
by a greater propensity for racial minorities to have evidence of
crime or weapons, but the hit-rates for catching racial minorities
with contraband were significantly lower than for whites.112 This
strongly suggests that the NYPD’s targeting of black and Latinx men
was an inefficient use of resources because the high rates of racial
minority stops in New York City were the product of a deliberate
policy of stopping “the right people,” which the Floyd court found
was code for young, of color, and male.113 In New York City, then,
programmatic use of Terry stops and frisks meant racial profiling.
If programmatic stop and frisk meant racial profiling in New
York City, might we expect similar results elsewhere? Undoubtedly.
The question, then, is how harmful is this phenomenon?
2. GENERAL SOCIAL CONTROL OF YOUNG BLACK AND LATINX
MALES
As sociologist Victor Rios demonstrates, programmatic stop and
frisk has concrete effects on young black and Latinx men. Rios’s
careful qualitative investigation of the lives of young black and
Latinx males in Oakland supports that conclusion.114 From before
110

Meares, supra note 4, at 173–74 (first emphasis added).
Id.
112
See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (“Contraband other than weapons was
seized in 1.8% of stops of blacks, 1.7% of the stops of Hispanics, and 2.3% of the
stops of whites.”); see also Goel et al., supra note 6, at 209 (analyzing Floyd).
Richardson sees a reasonableness problem in the low hit rates of stop-and-frisks.
See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 12, at 2037–41. She would factor officer accuracy into reasonableness by requiring an articulation of the connection between
officer training and/or experience and the judgment of suspiciousness. Id. Legal
scholar Jane Bambauer notes that “NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program had such a
low hit rate, and was so active, that the enterprise consisted almost entirely of
hassle. And that hassle had an outsize effect on minority communities.” Bambauer, supra note 101, at 500.
113
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 602–04.
114
VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO
BOYS, at xiv (2011).
111
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puberty, the 118 subjects of his study were pervasively criminalized
in interactions with the police and school authorities.115 Through
constant, suspicious surveillance, young black and Latinx males are
constructed as always already suspect in schools and on the street.116
Rios further demonstrates that “[m]inor citations for ‘little shit’
played a crucial role in pipelining many of the young men in this
study deeper into the criminal justice system.”117 The school-toprison pipeline is thus a real force in the lives of young black and
Latinx men.
Criminalization of young black and Latinx males should be understood as a form of social control that constitutes them as a socially marginalized population.118 This Article uses “social control”
to denote ways in which society marshals institutions to cabin in
disfavored social groups.119 We are still speaking mostly of hegemony, a dominant group’s coercion of other groups through ideology
rather than brute force,120 but hegemony can take a more virulent
form when aimed at socially marginalized groups.121 In this view,
115
Id. at xv, 5 (“This cycle began before their first arrest—it began as they
were harassed, profiled, watched, and disciplined at young ages, before they had
committed any crimes.”).
116
Cf. Nancy Dowd, Black Boys Matter: Developmental Equality, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 47, 73 (2016) (discussing school-to-prison pipeline in relation to
black boys). Of course, there are groups that are more socially controlled, such as
trans men; however, recognizing this difference just illuminates how social control is tailored to the group and the context. Gia Elise Barboza et al., Physical
Victimization, Gender Identity and Suicide Risk Among Transgender Men and
Women, 4 PREVENTIVE MED. REP. 385, 385 (2016).
117
RIOS, supra note 114, at 44.
118
See id. at xv.
119
A fuller theory of contemporary Western political structure would note that
neoliberal societies are increasingly “centaur states”: They are soft on the top of
society by means of deregulation and hard on the bottom through decreased social
welfare programs, increased punishment regimes, and a general culture of individual responsibility. See Peter Squires & John Lea, Introduction: Reading Loïc
Wacquant — Opening Questions and Overview, in CRIMINALISATION AND ADVANCED MARGINALITY: CRITICALLY EXPLORING THE WORK OF LOÏC WACQUANT
1, 6 (Peter Squires & John Lea eds., 2012) (conceptualizing centaur state).
120
See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A
Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV.
851, 859 (2002) [hereinafter, Cooper, Un-Balanced Fourth] (defining hegemony).
121
See, e.g., Trina Jones & Kimberly Jade Norwood, Aggressive Encounters
& White Fragility: Deconstructing the Trope of the Angry Black Woman, 102
IOWA L. REV. 2017, 2054 (2017).
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social persuasion sometimes veers toward social coercion.122 Social
control is thus pervasive, targeted coercion of particular social
groups.
Social control is more significant than discrete incidences of discrimination because it reflects and helps enforce the subordinate social status of the target group.123 As legal scholar Mario Barnes puts
it, “policing practices teach members of certain groups that they
have no access to the privileges of full citizenship.”124 So, programmatic stop and frisk should be considered part of the culture of control that governs through crime control by punishing the poor.125
Today, programmatic stop and frisk stands on the precipice of
nationwide proliferation.126 This should concern anyone who wishes
to protect civil liberties and civil rights.127
II. TOWARD A NEW SCHOLARLY APPROACH
To better understand the relationship between programmatic
stop and frisk and social control of young black and Latinx men, we
need to take a different approach. Whereas current approaches to
programmatic stop and frisk concentrate on its efficacy or see it as a
reflection of individual officers’ biases, we ought to move on to a
discussion of how it fits within the broader social structure. While
critiques of the practice as biased are accurate, they need to go further to reveal that programmatic stop and frisk was created to pro-
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Squires & Lea, supra note 119, at 1.
See Mario Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins—Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 711, 721 (2015) (considering insights from Eric J. Miller, Police
Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735, 753 (2015)).
124
Id.
125
See GARLAND, supra note 29, at 99–100, 102. See generally KAARYN S.
GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 176–79 (2012) (tracing political discourse of “welfare cheats”
to prosecutions of poor women); SIMON, supra note 30, at 182; LOÏC WACQUANT,
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY
76–109 (2009) (arguing Western governments are managing the social costs of
rolling back social safety nets by incapacitating the poor).
126
Josh Saul, America Has a Stop-and-Frisk Problem. Just Look at Philadelphia, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/
2016/06/10/stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-crisis-reform-police-460951.html.
127
Id.
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mote and does in fact promote social control. This Article’s new approach presents a critical vantage point that draws upon cultural
studies analysis of discourses and sociology’s tripartite analysis of
social phenomena. It extends the work of critical criminologists such
as David Garland, Kaaryn Gustafson, Jonathan Simon, and Loïc
Wacquant, with the goal of creating counter-discourses that can
undo current doctrinal trends as well as the broad racial backlash that
has characterized much of the post-civil rights era.128
A. Current Approaches
Many scholars criticize programmatic stop and frisk, though
some applaud it. Supporters of the practice generally assert that it
reduces crime.129 That supposition derives from the Giuliani/Bloomberg era in New York City, when the New York Police Department
accomplished a large crime reduction from the mid-1990s to
2010.130 Anti-programmatic stop and frisk scholars generally challenge the practice because it disproportionately burdens racial minority communities.131 This Section of the Article critically reviews
the debate over programmatic stop and frisk.

128

See GARLAND, supra note 29, at 5–6, 193–205 (showing crime control discourse led to greater social control); GUSTAFSON, supra note 125, at 43–52 (discussing workfare as the flipside of neoliberal movement to govern through crime
control); SIMON, supra note 29, at 90–105 (demonstrating neoliberal societies
govern through methods including and analogous to crime control); WACQUANT,
PRISONS OF POVERTY, supra note 29, at 71–84 (revealing mass incarceration is a
strategy for replacing welfare).
129
See ZIMRING, supra note 11, at 100 (describing how New York City officials took credit for the city’s crime drop and attributed it to a change in policing);
Weisburd et al., supra note 11, at 46–47 (contending that aggressive stop and frisk
intervention produces a crime drop); cf. Braga et al., supra note 11, at 658 (asserting “hot spot[] policing programs generate modest crime control gains”).
130
See ZIMRING, supra note 11, at 147; Bellin, supra note 4, at 1497 (citing
drop from 2,245 homicides in 1990 to 419 in 2012).
131
See, e.g., Goel et al., supra note 6, at 185 (asserting programmatic stop and
frisk is racially targeted and affects legitimacy of police in racial minority communities); Huq, supra note 4, at 2402 (contending programmatic stop and frisk
reproduces racial stratification); Meares, supra note 4, at 178–79 (concluding
young men of color bear burden of programmatic stop and frisk).
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1. SUPPORTERS OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK
The academics who support programmatic stop and frisk generally make three types of assertions: that it reduces crime; that it is
the most efficient use of resources; or that the narrower tactic of “hot
spot” policing is indispensable. However, programmatic stop and
frisk does not cause crime to drop, is not a more efficient allocation
of resources, and is not justified under a hot spots theory when it
becomes a generalized practice. Regardless, programmatic stop and
frisk is not worth the social costs it inflicts on black and Latinx communities.
In the provocatively titled book The City That Became Safe: New
York’s Lessons for Urban Crime and its Control, Franklin E. Zimring’s arguments exemplifiy the scholarly claims and arguments that
crime reduction resulted from changes in police practices.132 He and
other scholars point specifically to unusually sharp declines in crime
in New York City as evidence for their conclusions.133 Perhaps unsurprisingly, some of these claims are housed in an anthology curated by James Q. Wilson, who—as this Article will later demonstrate—was motivated by a conservative racial agenda.134
There is evidence that programmatic stop and frisk does not reduce crime. Yet, despite widespread claims that programmatic stop
and frisk causes crime reduction, “there are a number of studies indicating that the relationship between stop-and-frisk and
the crime decline in New York City is modest at best.”135 Research
“suggest[s] that . . . the bulk of the investigative stops [in New York
City] did not play an important role in the crime reductions.”136 As
described in Part I of this Article, these “investigative stops” are
characterized by pervasiveness, profiling of large areas as “high
132

See ZIMRING, supra note 11, at 147. Zimring notes that use of stop and frisk
“may add significant value to street policing efforts in New York City,” but there
is no conclusive evidence. Id. at 149.
133
See, e.g., Braga et al., supra note 11, at 658 (asserting hot spot policing
worked); Weisburd et al., supra note 11, at 47–48 (contending that an aggressive
stop and frisk intervention produces a crime drop).
134
See infra Section III.B.2 (describing Wilson’s role in creating a backlash
criminology that rationalized programmatic stop and frisk).
135
White et al., supra note 58, at 34.
136
Id. at 35 (quoting John MacDonald et al., The Effects of Local Police
Surges on Crime and Arrests in New York City, PLOS ONE, June 16, 2016, at 1,
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223).
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crime,” and racial targeting.137 Thus, the fundamental characteristics
of programmatic stop and frisk were unhelpful and, despite contrary
assertions from supporters, “did not play an important role in the
crime reductions.”138
Logic also counsels against concluding that programmatic stop
and frisk reduces crime. Although New York City experienced a
precipitous drop in crime from the mid-1990s into the 2000s,139
crime dropped almost everywhere during that time.140 Most of the
places that experienced a crime drop had not adopted programmatic
stop and frisk.141 Thus, at best, other factors were more responsible
for the general crime drop, and programmatic stop and frisk merely
accentuated it in New York City.142
Another group of scholars suggests that programmatic stop and
frisk, including its racial targeting, is economically efficient. Economists Decio Coviello and Nicola Persico looked at the NYPD stop
and frisk data used in the Floyd case and concluded the following:
(1) police stopped blacks much more frequently than whites and (2)
arrest rates of blacks and whites who were stopped are virtually identical.143 With respect to the first conclusion, they found “it difficult
to rule out unobservables, as opposed to officer bias, as potential
explanations for this disparity.”144 With respect to the second conclusion, they interpreted “this finding as inconsistent with the hypothesis that officers are biased in their stopping decisions, at least
on average.”145

137

See supra Part I.
White et al., supra note 58, at 35 (quoting MacDonald et al., supra note
136, at 1).
139
See id. at 33.
140
See Graham Farrell et al., Why the Crime Drop?, 43 CRIME & JUST. 421,
423, 425–32 (2014) (acknowledging “growing recognition of the international nature of the crime drop”).
141
Id. at 444–45.
142
See id.
143
See Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of BlackWhite Disparities in the New York Police Department’s Stop-and-Frisk Program,
44 J. LEGAL STUD. 315, 317–18 (2015). A third, “tentative” finding is that there
“[may be] police bias in decisions to frisk, but further research is needed.” Id. at
317.
144
Id.
145
Id.
138
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Coviello and Persico’s conclusions seem unwarranted. Even
Coviello and Persico find that there “[may be] police bias in decisions to frisk.”146 Their data might suggest that because racial targeting in stops does not lead to racially disparate arrests, over-stopping blacks is neutral in its impact on arrests.147 Police departments
use this type of argument to suggest that over-stopping racial minorities is resource efficient.148 However, as law and economics scholar
David Abrams suggests, it is strange for Coviello and Persico to absolve police officers of bias based on the small fraction of times that
police officers find a weapon that warrants an arrest.149 After all, the
NYPD finds weapons in approximately 1 in 50 frisks.150 Further, in
2012, the rate was closer to 1 in 600 in Philadelphia.151 Moreover,
recommending officers stop many more blacks to get the same rates
of weapons hits as when stopping far fewer whites does not seem
logical. The equal rates of finding weapons—despite the over-concentration of stopping blacks—suggests that police officers might be
more efficient if they equalized the rates of stopping blacks and
whites.152
Legal scholar Lawrence Rosenthal provides the most nuanced of
the conservative defenses of programmatic stop and frisk. The Supreme Court currently allows police officers’ assertions that an area
is “high crime” to be considered as a factor in reasonable suspicion
analysis. 153 One reading of Rosenthal’s approach is that he only supports a narrower version of programmatic stop and frisk that would
be based on policing “hot spots” of crime in order to remove guns.154
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Id. at 318.
Id. at 317.
148
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1516–17.
149
See David Abrams, The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk, 46 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 369, 377–78 (2014) (comparing potential economics methods for analyzing stop and frisk).
150
Id. at 378.
151
Id.
152
Cf. Police Efficiency, supra note 78, at 1179–80 (considering possibility of
police incentives to over-stop racial minorities).
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Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
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Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 706–14.
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Rosenthal’s position might be palatable if he limited aggressive
stops and frisks to actual spots rather than large areas.155 Such a limited hot spot could be a particular small park, but not an entire large
one like Central Park or Boston Common. A hot spot could also be
a particular intersection or house, but not multiple city blocks or a
whole neighborhood.
In practice, police departments do not circumscribe programmatic stop and frisk in the way that Rosenthal recommends. For instance, the NYPD tried to suggest that the entire boroughs, like
Queens and Staten Island, could be designated high crime areas.156
Unless courts limit the size of hot spots, which is highly unlikely,157
it will be impossible to contain police departments’ impulses to exploit the high crime area doctrine.158
One of Rosenthal’s central concerns is that police violence will
lead to overregulation of police departments and, in turn, to de-policing of racial minority neighborhoods.159 That is a valid concern.160
Nonetheless, Rosenthal’s approach underestimates the costs of not
addressing police bias against and violence towards racial minority
communities.161

155

See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 578 (S.D.N.Y.)
(noting expansive high crime areas are “of questionable value”), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
156
Id.
157
See Andrew Dammann, Categorical and Vague Claims That Criminal Activity is Afoot: Solving the High Crime Area Dilemma Through Legislative Action,
2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 559, 562–66 (2015) (criticizing lack of constraints on “high
crime” area); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime
Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth
Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1597–98
(2008) (noting Supreme Court “provided no guidance as to the meaning of the
term ‘high crime area’”); Shirazi, supra note 10, at 94 (discussing courts’ discussions of “high crime area”).
158
See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 157, at 1597–98.
159
Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 723–25.
160
See Cooper, Understanding ‘De-policing,’ supra note 62, at 363–64 (identifying phenomenon of de-policing and calling for right-sized policing of racial
minority communities).
161
See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 694–700; Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law
on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-escalation, Pre-seizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 630, 689–90 (2018) (proposing model statute regarding police use of deadly force).
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Even if there were regulation reduction, efficiency of resources,
or crime reduction benefits in conducting programmatic stops and
frisks, they would not be worth the cost.162 The costs of programmatic stop and frisk include reduced cooperation with the police163
and a loss in the “perceived legitimacy of the legal system.”164 As
racial minority communities bring forth ever more stories of unequal
and even brutal policing, the police face reduced cooperation from
civilians of all backgrounds.165 Police harassment of young racial
minority men reduces the legitimacy of the police throughout society.166
2. CRITIQUES OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK AS BIASBASED
Early scholarship on Terry doctrine concentrated on whether it
led to racial profiling; the answer soon came back in the affirmative.167 Racial profiling occurs when law enforcement uses an individual’s race to stereotype him as thereby more likely to commit a

162

See Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your
Health, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689, 692 (2016) (revealing stop and frisk
may have negative effects on health).
163
Goel et al., supra note 6, at 185.
164
Id.
165
See Tracey Meares & Tom Tyler, Policing: A Model for the Twenty-first
Century, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN, supra note 2, at 167 (arguing for new style
of policing).
166
Id.
167
See Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black
Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1273–75 (1998) (collecting stories of racial profiling); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.4(f) (5th ed. 2017) (collecting critiques of Whren pretext doctrine’s allowance of racial profiling). See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial
Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1279
(2004) (identifying racial profiling’s “ratchet effect”); David A. Harris, Factors
for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69
IND. L.J. 659, 681, 688 (1994) [hereinafter Factors for Reasonable Suspicion]
(demonstrating that Terry doctrine encourages racial profiling); Sherri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 225–37 (1983)
(showing cases where race motivated police intrusion); Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 956, 989 (1999) (linking racial profiling to stereotyping).
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crime.168 Racially disparate policing is a fact.169 Justifications like
those considered in the previous Section of this Article are unsatisfactory. There is no need for an exhaustive review of the racial profiling literature, but a summary of how it has focused on individual
police officers’ biases will be useful.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, scholars paid close attention to the process of stereotyping by police officers. They demonstrated that stereotyping is a common process of thinking that
shrinks information into bite-sized packets. 170 Stereotyping takes
perceived patterns in the behaviors of social groups and assumes that
individuals from the group will fit the pattern.171 Because Terry doctrine allows police officers to act on small bits of information,172 it
enhances the chance that officers will use stereotypes to make judgments about suspicion. Given preexisting stereotyping of black men
as criminals, that is a problem.173
Other critics of racial profiling have pointed out how racial bias
builds upon itself. They have revealed the “ratchet effect” in racial
profiling. The ratchet effect describes how racial targeting by police
inevitably leads to finding criminals amongst racial minorities,
which in turn is used tautologically to rationalize further racial targeting.174 Even though rates of drug use are roughly equal across

168

See Cooper, Who’s the Man?, supra note 2, at 675, n.15 (defining racial
profiling); Factors for Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 167, at 660 (providing
early critique of racial profiling).
169
See Factors for Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 167, at 679 (“Put in the
simplest terms, the criminal justice system treats African Americans and Hispanic
Americans differently than it does whites. . . . [T]hese inequalities reach down to
the first level of the criminal justice process, the points at which police decide
who they will investigate.”).
170
See Thompson, supra note 167, at 983–85 (describing processes of grouping information).
171
Id. at 985; see David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in
Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes;
Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 454–55 (2003) [hereinafter Using Race or Ethnicity].
172
See Using Race or Ethnicity, supra note 171, at 454–55; Thompson, supra
note 167, at 986–87.
173
See Using Race or Ethnicity, supra note 171, at 454–55; Thompson, supra
note 167, at 988.
174
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING,
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 147–49 (defining ratchet effect).
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races,175 police, prosecutors, and judges arrest, charge, and sentence
racial minorities at dramatically higher rates than racial majorities.176 Nonetheless, actors in the criminal justice system often point
to the disparities in arrest and sentencing as evidence that they are
right to focus on racial minorities.177 They are using racial disparities
produced by their own racial targeting to justify more racial targeting.
Scholars also contend that when explicit bias does not lead to
racial profiling, implicit bias may be at work. Implicit bias is stereotyping we do unconsciously.178 Hence, police officers may instinctively find a group of racial minority teenagers more suspicious than
a group of white youths.
The problem with the bulk of the scholarship attacking programmatic stop and frisk, however, is that it focuses on bias at the micro
level. For instance, L. Song Richardson, Dean of Univeristy of California, Irvine School of Law, would have us concentrate on patterns
of bias as revealed by police officer hit-rates.179 Conversely, the
Goel et al. approach suggests using big data to evidence a pattern of
discrimination cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.180 Legal scholar Aziz Huq has recently proposed moving to a disparate
impact methodology, which would consider statistical evidence of
biased policing.181 These interventions still concentrate on the micro
175

See, e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 18 (2004) (declaring
rates of drug use unsupportive of racial profiling).
176
See, e.g., Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of Racial
Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827,
831–35 (2003) (critiquing racial profiling in the criminal justice system).
177
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1515–16 (“Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Kelly . . . argue that the critics have it backwards, ‘we disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too little.’” (quoting Jennifer Fermino,
Mayor Bloomberg On Stop-And-Frisk: It Can Be Argued ‘We Disproportionately
Stop Whites Too Much. And Minorites Too Little,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 28,
2013, 6:37 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mayor-bloomberg-stopand-frisk-disproportionately-stop-whites-minorities-article-1.1385410)).
178
See Police Efficiency, supra note 78, at 1146–47 (defining implicit bias).
179
See id. at 1165–66 (suggesting officer hit rates could provide evidence of
bias).
180
See Goel et al., supra note 6, at 222–28 (proposing using data to make
Equal Protection claims).
181
See Huq, supra note 4, at 2466–78 (contending disparate impact approach
might better address police discrimination).
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level by looking at the behavior of police officers, either individually
or in the aggregate.
Missing from these bias-based approaches is a challenge to the
macro- and meso-level discourses that encourage racial profiling
policies. General societal discourses suggesting there is a hierarchy
of races and specific scholarly discourses about crime and policing
are promoting legal doctrines that enable police bias.182 Current
scholarship can reveal that bias, but not its source.183 If a new remedy merely punishes bias at the micro level, the macro- and mesolevel taste for bias will remain. The theory of preservation through
transformation would say that after such reforms, we should expect
bias to reconstitute itself in new ways.184
B. The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit: Three Levels of Analysis
When we see a local practice like programmatic stop and frisk,
we should not think of it as sui generis. The basic question is how
does a big picture idea that has gained society-wide traction influence what the police do on the street? The answer is that big picture
discourses fight for hegemony on the macro level of society and, if
they achieve it, promulgate discipline-specific discourses at the
meso level that may then be translated into specific micro-level practices. Consequently, this Article uses a three-layer model to describe
how broad cultural discourses become instantiated in particular police practices.
Before explicating the new model for analyzing discourses, it
will be helpful to define discourse. A discourse is a coherent narrative, or story, which seeks to be the dominant take on a topic.185 As
182

See infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
See, e.g., Goel et al., supra note 6; Huq, supra note 4; Police Efficiency,
supra note 78.
184
See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62
UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1185 n.129 (2015) (stating that under preservation through
transformation, “the older systems of status privilege are translated and transposed
into a new historical period in accord with a less controversial social idiom but in
a manner that effectively protects prior subordinating relationships”) (citing Reva
B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2120 (1996)); see also Huq, supra note 4, at 2402 (declaring
programmatic stop and frisk reproduces racial stratification).
185
See Hall, supra note 13, at 44 (defining effects of a discourse); see also
Cooper, Un-Balanced Fourth, supra note 120, at 864–76 (defining discourses in
relation to the War on Drugs).
183

36

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

crucial cultural studies theorist Stuart Hall declared, “what we think
we ‘know’ in a particular period about, say, crime has a bearing on
how we regulate, control and punish criminals.”186 Discourses are
the narratives that seek to make us “know” something about a
topic.187 Analyzing the discourses about crime that led to programmatic stop and frisk will help us better understand and more effectively address the practice.
In a forthcoming article that takes an approach simpatico to this
one, legal scholars Osagie Obasogie and Zachary Newman challenge the framing of the Fourth Amendment as exogenous to the police and community interactions on the ground.188 They conducted a
content analysis of policies of the police forces in the seventy-five
largest cities nationwide189 and found that the policies ape the ambiguity of Fourth Amendment excessive force doctrine, and further
add language protecting the police from lawsuits.190 Contrary to the
notion that the Constitution dictates police behavior, they found that
courts instead read police policies and then import police theories
into the doctrine.191 Hence, police departments are actually driving
the doctrine that is supposedly constraining them.192 This is what
Obasogie and Newman call the endogenous nature of Fourth
Amendment doctrine.193
While Obasogie and Newman are right to reject the idea that
doctrine simply imposes its will on police practices, they miss aspects of the discourse-to-practice-circuit. That influence starts
above the level that Obasogie and Newman concentrate upon. At the
macro level, political and cultural discourses influence arguments
about what the law should be.194 At the meso level, politics and culture influence both discipline-specific (criminology) arguments for
186

Hall, supra note 13, at 49.
See Cooper, Un-Balanced Fourth, supra note 120, at 857.
188
Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Endogenous Fourth Amendment: An Empirical Assessment of How Police Understandings of Excessive
Force Become Constitutional Law, 36–52 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the University of Miami Law Review).
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Id. at 18.
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See id. at 7.
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See id. at 7–8.
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See id.
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See infra Section II.B.1.
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certain policing policies, as well as the legal doctrines that judges
propound.195 Obasogie and Newman helpfully point out that, at least
in legal doctrine, discourses about what the law should allow police
officers to do may be influenced by the micro-level police practices
themselves.196
It is still important to note that the three levels of the discourseto-practice-circuit are hierarchized, as large cultural discourses have
more influence on police behavior than police departments’ wishes
have on the legal doctrines they must follow. Certainly, Obasogie
and Newman’s research on judicial acceptance and reinforcement of
police department policies shows that popular discourses cannot
simply dictate micro level practices. When the police are able to successfully present discourses suggesting that facts on the ground require they be granted more discretion, courts of both law and of public opinion do indeed tend to shift their perspectives.197 In this sense,
we are talking about a circuit where the different components influence one another in multiple directions. But Obasogie and Newman’s finding is striking because it is unusual. The reason that conservative justices gutted excessive force doctrine at the meso level
is because the justices were ideologically motivated by cultural discourses at the macro level.198 The endogenous Fourth Amendment
is thus the Fourth Amendment drunk on the call for law and order.
Macro- and meso-level discourses cannot dictate practices, but they
sure can influence them.
What this Article terms a discourse-to-practice-circuit may be
diagrammed as seen in the Figure that follows on the next page. The
Figure depicts the discourse-to-practice-circuit as a horizontal rectangle on top of a triangle on top of an upside down triangle. The
first layer, the macro level, is broad and thin to show that it is a big
idea that has spread throughout society. The next layer, the meso
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See infra Section II.B.2.
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See id. at 9–17 (citing John Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 155,
161 (2016)).
198
Mark Joseph Stern, The Conservatives vs. Sonia Sotomayor, SLATE (Apr.
2, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/sonia-sotomayorhas-become-a-lonely-voice-fighting-against-the-supreme-courts-rightwardturn.html.
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level, starts at a point and fans out to show that meso-level discourses stem from a particular macro-level discourse, but act upon
multiple domains, such as both legal doctrine and criminology. The
final layer, the micro level, starts broad but narrows to a point because it is influenced by multiple meso-level discourses that come
together in a specific policy and particular police officer behaviors.
There are arrows from the micro level to the meso level and from
the meso level to the macro level because police behaviors do exercise some influence on the further development of discipline-specific discourses, which in turn influence broad cultural ideologies.
This Article’s basic message is that criminal procedure scholars
need to pay more attention to the macro and meso levels of discourses about policing. This Section of the Article provides a methodology for engaging in that process.
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1. MACRO LEVEL
When we are trying to discern why a particular policing practice
developed, the macro level is where we consider society-wide cultural discourses. Society-wide discourses are usually spread by politicians and other important popular figures with a national profile.199 Hence, it is no surprise that groups like the National Rifle
Association (“NRA”) used popular entertainers such as actor Charlton Heston and basketball player Karl Malone to promote their progun agenda through their “I’m the NRA” campaign.200 In the present
context, it took people of the stature of presidential candidates Barry
Goldwater and Richard Nixon to help make the “law and order” discourse pervasive.201
Such broad macro-level discourses are ideologies: they are arguments about how society does or should work.202 However, there are
often multiple visions of society at a given time. The goal of creating
or maintaining a particular type of society must be promoted through
discourses. 203 The discourses that compete on the macro level are
essentially arguments about how we should view phenomena occurring in the social world.204 Macro-level discourses thus take the form
of arguments making claims as if they are facts.
For instance, in the broad sense, police racial targeting traces its
roots to a macro-level discourse arguing that there is or ought to be
a racial hierarchy.205 Philosopher Iris Marion Young refers to this as
the Western philosophical assumption that there is a “scaling of bodies.”206 The scaling of bodies is a metaphor about the presumption
199

See, e.g., Charlie Allenson, NBA’s Karl Malone: The Mailman or the Gunman?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2016, 10:56 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlie-allenson/nbas-karl-malone-mailman-or-the-gunman_b_8934940.html; Margot Hornblower, Have Gun, Will Travel: But Can
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See Allenson, supra note 199; Hornblower, supra note 199, at 46.
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203
See id.
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that humans can scientifically (really ideologically) categorize
groups of people and assign values to them.207 Early in Western epistemology, bodies were categorized and hierarchized along various
axes: race, sex, religion, age, and economic status.208 White AngloSaxon Christian men, who had wealth and were neither too young
nor too old, were at the top of this hierarchy.209 But the fundamental
problem is the very assumption that there can be a scaling of bodies.
The assumption that there is a scaling of bodies is connected to
the long-running ideology of white supremacy and continues to have
influence. Consider how racial hierarchy has been hardwired into
United States culture through different discourses over time. The assumption of white supremacy animated the following ideologies that
rationalized slavery from 1619 to 1864210: “manifest destiny” ias
characterizedby the theft of Mexican territory and marginalization
of former Mexicans,211 post-bellum terrorism attempting to reinstate
slavery,212 Jim Crow segregation,213 Chinese exclusion,214 Japanese
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Id. at 125, 128.
Id. at 127.
209
See id. at 128.
210
See JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR
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WORLD WAR II, at 3–4 (2008).
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but equal’ doctrine in 1896 as ushering in the era of Jim Crow segregation.” Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and
the “Separate but Equal” Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 17, 18–
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alien land laws,215 whites-only affirmative action,216 “massive resistance” to civil rights,217 and so on.
This Article points to the broad cultural discourse calling for
“law and order” as a recent way in which racial hierarchy has been
maintained. The law and order discourse occurs at the macro level
because it is an ideological statement about how society should be
and because it is capacious enough to encompass an array of substatements. It supports meso-level discourses claiming that civil
rights have gone too far, judges ought not “handcuff” the police, racial profiling is rational,218 and so on.219 The next Part of this Article
will analyze how the law and order discourse at the meso level first
spurred meso-level doctrinal and criminological discourses and then
the micro-level practice of programmatic stop and frisk. For now,
we must remember that macro-level discourses are broad social narratives that seek to organize the thinking on a topic.
2. MESO LEVEL
When analyzing the macro level of policing discourses, we concentrate on broad cultural narratives, but those narratives have subplots. The meso level of policing discourses contains two broad
types of discourses. In legal discourse, meso-level narratives set a
tone for more conservative or more progressive doctrine. In scholarship about policing, meso-level narratives set a tone for more crime
control or more civil liberties-oriented policy proposals.
The key to understanding how macro-level discourses affect legal doctrine is realizing the fact that doctrine is contingent upon history. There was no inexorable march to conservative Terry doctrine.

215
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Instead, macro-level discourses, like the call for law and order, propelled Nixon into office.220 Nixon then appointed conservative Supreme Court Justices who substantially reworked the progressive
Warren Court doctrine.221 Therefore, legal doctrine can be influenced by macro-level discourses.
Moreover, legal doctrines themselves are meso-level discourses
subject to contestation. An example is the argument222 between majority and dissent in United States v. Robinson, where the majority
held that police may fully search someone they are arresting as a
matter of right.223 The Court held such searches incident to lawful
arrests were constitutional even if the officer admittedly knew the
suspect posed no threat to anyone.224 The Robinson decision rejected
considering an officer’s state of mind on the grounds that “[a] police
officer’s determination as to how and where to search . . . is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment.”225 This theory provided the core
rationale for the later Whren pretext rule.226 But the Robinson narrative did not go unremarked.227 Justice Marshall wrote a stinging dissent noting the substantial precedent for limiting the search incident
to arrest rule.228 However, the Marshall discourse lost.229
Doctrinal discourses, such as the argument that police must have
easily administrable rules,230 influence the realm of possibilities for
220
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Id. at 236.
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See Frank Rudy Cooper, Post-Racialism and Searches Incident to Arrest,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 114 (2012) (detailing this connection).
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police officers. The Robinson rule means police officers can choose
to go on “fishing expeditions” for evidence as long as they can point
to an arrestable offense.231 Had the Robinson Court accepted Justice
Marshall’s argument, police would have to find other means of justifying searches or simply forego such fishing expeditions.232 The
Robinson Court’s conservative doctrine expanded the range of micro-level practices police officers could engage in on the street. Doctrinal discourses are thus both contingent upon history and materially consequential.
Non-legal discourses about policing at the meso level are obviously more contingent upon history. These are the discourses that
apply a broad cultural narrative to the specific topic of crime and
policing. Criminologists, public policy think tanks, journalists, and
similar “authorities” propound theories of what causes crime and
how policing does or should work. Those theories and policy proposals influence the micro-level practices of police officers.
Criminological discourses influence practices by creating a public consensus that certain police behaviors are, or are not, appropriate. Hence, during the “crack crisis,” the preexisting trend toward
law and order led journalists to convince the public there was such
a crisis and that it required strong medicine.233 While the facts on the
ground supported the idea there was a crisis, the framing of the issue
as a matter of crime control was contingent upon history.234 Note
that today, even a law and order president occasionally supports rehabilitative measures regarding the opioid crisis.235 Times have
changed, as have the complexion and class of the paradigmatic victims of drug abuse.236 Unsurprisingly, the narrative about what to do
regarding the crisis has changed as well.237
231
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The bottom line at the meso level is that doctrinal and criminological sub-discourses come together to create both the range of
practices police officers may engage in at the micro level and the
likelihood that officers will choose to engage in a particular practice.
The meso level thus is influenced by the macro level and influences
the micro level.
3. MICRO LEVEL
The micro level of policing discourses is that of actual police
officer behaviors. In short, broad cultural discourses at the macro
level that spur legal doctrines and policy arguments at the meso level
influence the extent to which officers feel supported in using (or
abusing) their discretion at the micro level. While Obasogie and
Newman are right that police practices can feed ideas back up to the
meso level, police try to influence legal doctrine precisely because
it has such an impact on what they feel free to do.238
In this sense, legal doctrine creates a group of potential police
practices.239 Police officers can make choices, but mostly within the
range of options created by the Supreme Court. While officers can
and do act outside of that valid range of choices, they risk exclusion
of the evidence, admission of which is generally the point of the action.240 To the extent that officers act outside their valid scope and
do not care about evidence, they still lose the law’s stamp of approval.241 They can abuse someone just to “maintain the power image of the beat officer,”242 but they risk triggering a popular backlash
against their behavior.
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While legal doctrine sets a range of practices for police officers,
popular opinions and prevailing policing policies affect the likelihood that officers will choose to act in particular ways. As I have
said elsewhere, “[w]ith respect to police officers, we wish to understand why they might investigate people with more or less frequency
in a specific community at a particular time. One influence upon that
choice is the prevailing set of discourses about the appropriateness
of law enforcement methods.”243
To understand the micro-level practice of racial profiling, we
should look at the meso-level discourses that influence police officer
behavior. The question then is, why do officers racially profile? The
answer, at the micro level, is that officers do not expect to receive
an unbearable amount of pushback from people who can potentially
influence their lives.244 That answer can also be traced back to the
meso level, where the Whren doctrine promotes racial profiling245
and where authoritative opinions on policing policy are hardly
staunchly against the practice. Micro-level police behaviors are thus
ultimately the product of macro- and meso-level attempts to marshal
public opinion for, or against, practices like programmatic stop and
frisk.
The reason that the bottom of Figure 1 depicts an upside down
triangle is to illustrate that things come to a head in a particular policing practice, but only after being influenced by broader phenomena. Consequently, while the micro level is where the action is in
terms of programmatic stop and frisk, that level is heavily influenced
by the macro and meso levels of discourse on policing. To demonstrate the utility of using this new scholarly model, and to better understand why programmatic stop and frisk has become so pervasive,
the next Part of the Article will conduct a genealogy of the practice.
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III. CASE STUDY: A GENEALOGY OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND
FRISK
So far, this Article has revealed that programmatic stop and frisk
is a means of social control of young black and Latinx men and that
prior scholarship has not taken the right approach to fully understand
the problem. A better approach would conduct a genealogy of how
the micro-level practice of programmatic stop and frisk is the product of macro- and meso-level discourses. This Part of the Article
conducts that genealogy.
What we will discover is that the broad, social narrative at the
macrolevel that spawned programmatic stop and frisk is the political
call for law and order. That call is a macro-level ideology; it is a
view of how United States society is (too crime-ridden) and ought
to be—too crime-ridden and aggressively authoritarian in law enforcement, respectively. At the meso level, larger conservative legal
doctrines—for example, acceptance of the pretext doctrine—and aggressive theories of policing—such as fixing “broken windows”—
more directly led to programmatic stop and frisk. Programmatic stop
and frisk still required micro-level decisions by police departments
to take advantage of weakened doctrine and adopt aggressive methodologies. This genealogy helps us better understand the relationship between broad calls for law and order, conservative legal and
criminological theories, and programmatic stop and frisk practices.
A. Macro Level: “Law and Order” as Cultural Backlash
This Section of the Article considers the macro level of the move
toward programmatic stop and frisk and argues that programmatic
stop and frisk is a means by which the white majority has accomplished a larger subconscious goal of putting young black and Latinx
males in urban environments “under lock and key.”246 Law enforcement justifies this “New Jim Crow” through calls for law and order.247
Calls for law and order of the type we see today began in the
1960s.248 That is no coincidence, as sudden social change helped
create consternation for those used to (and invested in) the status
246

CHRIS HAYES, A COLONY IN A NATION 32 (2017).
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2010).
248
See MAYER, supra note 201, at 69–70.
247

48

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

quo.249 The civil rights movements of the 1960s were thus soon followed by a post-civil rights anxiety.250 “That anxiety spr[ang] from
the conflict between the nation’s tradition of excluding [racial minorities] from the mainstream of society and its more recent commitment to providing the opportunity for some [racial minorities] to
be included.”251 If racial minorities are suddenly moving too fast,
both physically and figuratively, the answer is for whites to slow the
racial minorities down.252 This Section of the Article shows how
calls for law and order served the goal of resolving post-civil rights
anxiety.
Scholars have documented that arguments for law and order
emerged as coded racial appeals to whites.253 Nixon’s law and order
narrative capitalized on white anger over three things: (1) civil rights
protests; (2) the Supreme Court’s expansion of defendants’ rights;
and (3) public welfare programs that “rewarded undeserving minorities.”254 John Ehrlichman, who was then one of Nixon’s top aides,
acknowledged that the call for law and order was meant to make
blacks enemies of the state.255 According to Ehrlichman, “[w]e
249
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knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or black,
but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and
blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could
disrupt those communities.”256 In light of this evidence, we have to
consider calls for law and order to be suspect.
In the law and order era, white people’s lack of empathy for
young black and Latinx men who are racially targeted by police is
driving punitive policies. Social commentator Ta-Nehisi Coates illuminates this connection:
The truth is that the police reflect America in all of
its will and fear, and whatever we might make of this
country’s criminal justice policy, it cannot be said
that it was imposed by a repressive minority. The
abuses that have followed from these polices—the
sprawling carceral state, the random detention of
black people, the torture of suspects—are the product
of democratic will.257
Coates’s statement asserts that if our police officers are pervasively
racially profiling—and they are—it can only be because the public
generally supports such tactics. The law and order discourse thus
helps justify a policy that reflects and expresses a profound lack of
empathy for young, urban, racial minority men.
Sadly, we see strong echoes of the law and order narrative today.
As political commentator Chris Hayes bluntly puts it, “[i]n the Nation [or white communities], there is law; in the Colony [or black
communities] there is only a concern with order.”258 Scholars have
recognized that the law and order narrative set the tone for the War
on Crime and War on Drugs.259 Hence, in keeping with the three
aspects of Nixon’s law and order narrative,260 President Trump associates blacks with criminality,261 calls for a conservative Supreme
256
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Court,262 and argues Latinx immigrants are taking “our” jobs.263 Accordingly, the law and order narrative is as relevant today as it was
in the early 1970s.
To fully understand how the law and order narrative became the
dominant discourse on crime, we must recognize that it is really
about white fear and post-civil rights anxiety. White fear is based in
the subconscious belief that “‘[t]hey’—the black and brown subjects
of the Colony, the denizens of the ‘anarchic province of the poor’—
are angry and wild and uncivilized and are coming for us, to take
what ‘we’ have.”264 White fear is evidenced in laboratory studies,
wherein whites see all children as innocent until about age ten, then
only see white children, and not black children, as innocent.265 For
(2017) (“Trump wrongfully stated that the majority of homicides of White people
are committed by Black-Americans . . . . However, statistics show that most of
the crimes are intra-racial.”).
262
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https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/362546-huckabee-sanders-trumpsmark-on-the-judiciary-will-last-for-decades.
263
See Kari Hong, The Costs of Trumped-Up Immigration Enforcement
Measures, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 119, 148, http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HONG.38.symposium.pdf (“The full embrace of nativism by President Trump in targeting immigrants for deportation and
exclusion must be met with factual and emotional reasons for why we—as Americans—will be much worse off if that were to occur.”).
264
HAYES, supra note 246, at 132.
265
Id. at 115; see also Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and
Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1596–97
(2013) (suggesting expert testimony on shooter bias could help make trials fairer);
Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 807–08 n.52
(2012) (noting whites erroneously “shoot” blacks at higher rates). Similar results
are seen throughout the implicit bias literature, as employers devalue resumes
with black-sounding names. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, By
Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should
Apply Even If Lakeisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1283–84
(“[Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan’s] study revealed that simply
having an African American-sounding name significantly decreased one’s opportunity to receive a job interview, regardless of occupation or industry.”). Hayes
notes that fear of blacks is not limited to whites, writing: “In fact, while white
participants have higher levels of racial bias than nonwhite subjects, even African
Americans consistently show anti-black suspicion. Racial fear lives in the deepest
part of our psyches.” HAYES, supra note 246, at 116.
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Hayes, this represents whites’ “simple inability to recognize, deeply,
fully, totally, the humanity of those on the other side.”266
White dehumanization of blacks should not be surprising given
that today’s Baby Boomer whites, who currently run the country,267
are in privity with prior groups of whites who dehumanized blacks.
Baby Boomer whites are often the descendants of slaveholders.268
Baby Boomer whites are the progeny of people who either created
Jim Crow de jure segregation or allowed it to continue.269 Baby
Boomer whites’ grandparents were immigrants who did not have to
compete with blacks for jobs because blacks were not hired, either
out of custom or due to white immigrant lobbying.270 Baby Boomer
whites are also the children of people who benefitted from the whiteoriented GI Bill and the creation of racially segregated suburbs.271
In short, to be a Baby Boomer white today is to presently benefit
from the past subordination of blacks based on white ideologies of
genetic and/or cultural inferiority.272
However, dehumanization of blacks alone does not explain
white fear. “Othering” of blacks becomes fear of blacks because it
266

HAYES, supra note 246, at 127.
American Generation Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 4, 2018, 4:32 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/us/baby-boomer-generation-fast-facts/index.html (“Bill Clinton was the first baby boomer to serve as president. George
W. Bush, Barack Obama and President Donald Trump are also baby boomers.”).
268
See, e.g., EDWARD BALL, SLAVES IN THE FAMILY 7–11 (1998).
269
See, e.g., id.
270
See, e.g., RICHARD ARCHER, JIM CROW NORTH: THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUAL RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM NEW ENGLAND 3–16 (2017) (describing black
oppression in the North); JENNIFER RITTERHOUSE, GROWING UP JIM CROW: HOW
BLACK AND WHITE SOUTHERN CHILDREN LEARNED RACE 1–21 (2006) (exploring
racial formation in Jim Crow South).
271
See ARCHER, supra note 270, at 3–16; KATZNELSON, supra note 216, at
113–41; RITTERHOUSE, supra note 270, at 1–21.
272
“White people in North America live in a society that is deepely separate
and unequal by race, and white people are the beneficiaries of that separation and
inequality.” ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR
WHITE PEOPLE TO TALK ABOUT RACISM 1 (2018) Barbara Flagg argues that “[t]he
most striking characteristic of whites’ consciousness of whiteness is that most of
the time we don’t have any.” BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE:
WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW 1 (1998). Flagg terms this characteristic as “the transparency phenomenon,” which is “the tendency of whites not to
think about whiteness.” Id. (“Whites’ ‘consciousness’ of whiteness is predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness.”).
267
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is related to a fear that blacks will try to change the status quo.273
The leap from “othering” to fear occurs because of an implicit recognition that whites are privileged compared to blacks.274 White privilege is acknowledged in what Hayes calls “the forbidden
knowledge that all white people carry with them: We’ve got it better.”275 That forbidden knowledge of privilege is a burden because
it means recognizing there is racial inequality in a country that aspires to full equality.276 That is why whites have such a hard time
acknowledging privilege.277
More importantly, the knowledge of white privilege produces a
sense of vulnerability. As Hayes continues, “if white people have it
better, then isn’t it only logical that black people will try to come
and take what they have?”278 The logical movement is from “othering” blacks, to knowing they are subordinated, then to knowing that
subordination provides blacks with a reason to overthrow the system.279 Accordingly, whites may subconsciously assume that, if they
have it better than blacks, blacks must want to reverse that hierarchy.280 That thought process is the ultimate source of white fear.281

273

See HAYES, supra note 246, at 126–33.
See id.
275
Id. at 131.
276
See id. at 133 (“[W]e do know that having it ‘better’ isn’t permanent, that
it could collapse. We know equality might someday come, and it might mean
giving up one’s birthright or, more terrifyingly, having it taken away. That perhaps our destiny is indeed a more equal society, but one where equality means
equal misery, a social order where all the plagues of the ‘ghetto’ escape past its
borders and infect the population at large.”).
277
See id. (“White fear emanates from knowing that white privilege exists and
the anxiety that it might end. No matter how many white people tell pollsters that
‘today discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks’ (60 percent of the white working class in one poll), we know
that this story of antiwhite bias is not true.”). “Privilege” is “built-in advantages.”
Frank Rudy Cooper, Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory, 93
N.C. L. REV. 1339, 1374 (2015). Privileges often stem from identities. Id. at 1375.
278
HAYES, supra note 246, at 131.
279
See id. at 133.
280
See id. at 126–33.
281
See id.
274
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The law and order discourse thus owes some of its success to the
way it taps into whites’ psychological needs.282
The law and order discourse also helps resolve post-civil rights
anxiety. Racial majorities may want at some level to be egalitarian,
but also fear that the consequence of true equality would be racial
minorities replacing them at the top of the hierarchy.283 Hence, the
white supremacist Charlottesville protestors recently chanted, “you
will not replace us.”284 The anxiety regarding replacement is partially resolved by the law and order narrative, which promises to
keep potentially unruly populations in check.285
Put another way, a fundamental influence on society today is the
fact that the 1960s wrought sudden and thoroughgoing social
change, especially in race relations.286 Change made some people
nervous.287 Tension between egalitarian norms and racially hierarchized realities led some to call for progressive social change.288
It also led some people to promote a conservative racial agenda built
around calls for law and order.289

282

The vulnerability that some whites feel has sometimes been referred to as
“White Fragility”—“a state in which even a minimum amount of racial stress becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves.” Robin DiAngelo,
White Fragility, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54, 54 (2011) (discussing this
concept). See also Jones & Norwood, supra note 121 at 2051–55 (applying term
to treatment of black women).
283
See HAYES, supra note 246, at 126–33.
284
Brandon Carter, Ryan Denounces ‘Repugnant’ Views of Virginia White
Nationalist Marchers, HILL (Aug. 12, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/346314-ryan-denounces-repugnant-views-of-virginia-white-nationalist-marchers (reporting marchers also shouted “white lives matter”).
285
See Cook, supra note 22, at 82.
286
See generally MAYER, supra note 201, at 9–95 (discussing racial politics
in the 1960s during the civil rights movement).
287
See HAYES, supra note 246, at 126–33.
288
See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 13, at 1–11; Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 987–88 (1990).
289
See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 13, at 1–11; Jones & Norwood, supra note
121, at 2054 (“When White racial hegemony is challenged, as it is by the changing
demographics of the United States and movements like #SayHerName and
#BlackLivesMatter, backlash often results.”).
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B. Meso Level: Weakening Terry/Demonizing Young Men of
Color
The call for law and order in the late 1960s was a broad, cultural
discourse at the macro level that gained predominance in the 1970s
and 1980s and has been revived in the Trump era.290 That discourse
set a tone for discussions of crime at the meso level of doctrine. With
society, including some Supreme Court justices, generally convinced we needed law and order, the Supreme Court was less likely
to accept doctrines that prioritized due process rights.291 This caused
the doctrinal shift in criminal procedure following the Warren
Court.292 President Nixon appointed several justices who spurred a
counterrevolution against the Warren Court.293 That counterrevolution bore the fruit of the permissive Terry doctrine.294
As we have seen, doctrinal discourses at the meso level can
travel along with public policy discourses about policing.295 The law
and order discourse at the macro level inspired not just conservative
legal doctrine, but a conservative version of criminology.296 The
backlash criminologists mixed a general distaste for 1960s liberalism with biological and cultural arguments about black inferiority.297 Their product was the set of rationales for aggressive policing

290

See Chris Hayes, Opinion, Chris Hayes: What ‘Law and Order’ Means to
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/opinion/sunday/chris-hayes-trump-law-order.html.
291
See Reamey, supra note 221, at 57–61 (“The Warren Court stood for certain principles; the conservative element of the Burger Court appeared to stand
for one: find a way to put the criminal defendant in jail and keep him there.”).
292
See id. (“[T]he Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments had been seriously
damaged by the Burger Court, but . . . the principle-laden decisions of the Warren
Court era remained at least as symbolic reminders of better times.”).
293
See id.; see also Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution
in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2010) (“Rather than a left-liberal
egalitarian, or privacy-protecting rights regime, the central concern of the Warren Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was the republican interest in personal security, understood as non-domination. Extending security into areas hitherto unregulated by the law was a major concern of the Warren Court throughout
its tenure, exemplified by its decision in Terry.”).
294
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
295
See supra Section II.B.2.
296
See supra Section III.A.
297
See id.
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that would eventually yield the macro-level practice of programmatic stop and frisk.
1. THE DISCOURSES WEAKENING TERRY
Programmatic stop and frisk can be summarized as the aggressive application of the Terry doctrine. The facts of Terry are iconic.
McFadden, a white police officer with over thirty years on the force,
observed two black men, Terry and Chilton, walk back and forth in
front of a store window a dozen times.298 When Terry and Chilton
went to consult with Katz, a white man, McFadden halted all three
men and patted down the outside of each man’s clothing.299 Finding
weapons on Terry and Chilton, Officer McFadden arrested them for
illegal possession of the firearms, while eventually releasing Katz—
the only white man.300
The activity approved in the Terry decision was potentially modest.301 The Court concluded that when a police officer has what is
now known as “reasonable suspicion,” the officer may stop people
by requiring them to halt so that the officer may see if they are willing to answer questions.302 Likewise, if the officer can articulate further reasonable suspicion that the suspects are armed, the officer
may then frisk suspects by patting down the outside of their clothing
to uncover weapons posing a danger to herself or bystanders.303
Yet the Terry test has become little more than a speed bump for
aggressive police departments.304 The current reasonable suspicion
298

Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–6; see also Cooper, The “Seesaw Effect,” supra note
239, at 152 (illustrating the underlying racial disparities that the Court failed to
acknowledge in its justification of reasonable suspicion).
299
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6–7; see also Cooper, The “Seesaw Effect,” supra note
239, at 152.
300
Terry, 392 U.S. at 7; see also Cooper, The “Seesaw Effect,” supra note
239, at 152.
301
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1502–03.
302
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 30. Reasonable suspicion is defined as the ability to
state “specific and articulable facts” leading a reasonable officer to conclude a
crime is afoot and this person is involved. Id. at 21.
303
Id. at 30.
304
The creation of Terry doctrine and its slow but inevitable deterioration exemplifies the Court’s withdrawal from policing the police. See Cooper, Un-Balanced Fourth, supra note 120, at 885–86 (arguing reasonable suspicion test was
bound to deteriorate); Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
43, 45 (noting Terry’s inherent vulnerability to “facially subjective rationales such
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test for stops and frisks requires less proof than the probable cause
standard.305 The Court has gone so far as to allow a stop and frisk
based on articulation of as few as two factors: (1) a person’s flight
upon sight of the police when (2) the person is in a neighborhood the
police designate as “high crime.”306 Numerous scholars have identified “high crime area” as the principal rationale for blanketing black
and Latinx communities with stops and frisks.307
An important and insidious aspect of the weakening of Terry
doctrine has occurred slowly as Whren pretext doctrine has migrated
into the reasonable suspicion doctrine. Skipping forward to the mid1990s reveals why the Terry stop and frisk power can be so pervasively used for racial profiling. In Whren, the Court dealt with a
claim that District of Columbia undercover vice officers had stopped

as ‘furtive movements’”). As legal historian Thomas Davies documents, “the majority justices have pursued a multi-prong campaign to free police of constitutional constraints by restricting the coverage of Fourth Amendment protections,
by weakening or even eviscerating the substance of search and seizure standards,
and by largely eliminating the consequences of unconstitutional intrusions.”
Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 939 (2010).
305
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (“[T]he level of suspicion
required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause.”);
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329–30 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content
than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probably cause.”). Professor Fagan recently cited esteemed scholar William (Bill)
Stuntz for the proposition that probable cause requires a “more-likely-than-not,”
or a 50.1%, chance, while reasonable suspicion only requires 20–25% chance.
Fagan, supra note 304, at 52–53 (quoting William J. Stuntz, Terry and Substantive
Law, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1362, 1362 (2012)).
306
See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (concluding
that running at sight of police in a high-crime neighborhood can give rise to reasonable suspicion). But see Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass.
2016) (holding that black men might flee police for reasons other than criminality).
307
See, e.g., Fagan & Geller, supra note 7, at 70 tbl.1, 71 tbl.2, 73 tbl.3; Laurin, supra note 29, at 8 (“[High crime area] is a primary basis for police justifying
enormously high (and not enormously fruitful) numbers of stops in urban minority
neighborhoods.”).
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two black suspects because of their race.308 The Whren Court held
that as long as the police have probable cause, their intrusion satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness clause, except in extraordinary circumstances.309 The Court found this necessary to
avoid investigating police officers’ motivations, which it claimed
are difficult to discern.310 Regardless, the Court found that the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement means that certain
actions are acceptable no matter what their motivations.311 The
Court thus ignored the fact that no reasonable officers would have
made this stop and that the officers in this case violated department
regulations in doing so.312
Because Whren doctrine makes pretextual arrests and searches
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, defendants challenging
racial profiling must make the almost always quixotic trip to Fourteenth Amendment doctrine in search of relief.313 It is difficult to
make an Equal Protection claim against police in a context where
evidence of purposeful discrimination is hard to gather.314
Most importantly for our purposes, the Whren pretext rule,
which technically only applied to intrusions based on probable
cause, is seaping into Terry doctrine. As will be discussed, state
courts generally take Whren to mean that police officers may use a
Terry stop that is valid on any grounds as a pretext to investigate

308

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808–09 (1996).
Id. at 817.
310
See id. at 814–15.
311
Id. at 813.
312
Id. at 815 (“[Petitioners’] claim that a reasonable officer would not have
made this stop is based largely on District of Columbia police regulations which
permit plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles to enforce traffic laws only in
the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety
of others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
313
Profiling in America, supra note 245, at 1075; see also Floyd v. City of
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y.) (approving racial profiling claim
under Fourteenth Amendment), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013).
314
See Goel et al., supra note 6, at 198–99 (describing difficulties created by
the intent requirement).
309
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other potential crimes for which they lack even reasonable suspicion.315 Such an approach insulates the race-targeted nature of stop
and frisk from judicial scrutiny.
The Terry and Whren decisions were necessary enablers of programmatic stop and frisk. No other tool, especially not arrests under
a probable cause standard as understood in 1968,316 could be so easily used for widespread harassment of young racial minority men.
Nor can Terry’s use for programmatic racial targeting be explained
away as largely the product of subsequent social changes.317 The
usefulness of Terry stops for programmatic policing played a significant role in inspiring the racially targeted approach to policing.318
Further, the Whren pretext approach sent a signal to both policymakers and police officers that the Court did not care about police racial
profiling.319 The political call for law and order, as well as policy
proposals of backlash criminologists, could not have attained predominance in the form of programmatic stop and frisk without both
the insufficiently limited Terry-stop power and Whren’s tacit approval of racial targeting.
2. THE DISCOURSE OF BACKLASH CRIMINOLOGY
The law and order discourse argued that society needed to be
more heavily policed in general, but specific criminology theories
justified the particular methods of programmatic stop and frisk.
Consider, for instance, James Q. Wilson’s policing theories, which
justified aggressive policing that was known to be likely to target
racial minorities.320 Wilson was so influential in conservative and
policing circles that President George Bush awarded him the Medal
315

For a detailed state court application of pretext doctrine to stops and frisks,
see Margaret M. Lawton, State Responses to the Whren Decision, 66 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1039, 1047–48, 1050–53 (2016).
316
See Laurin, supra note 29, at 7 (noting that “a range of now-regular policecivilian contacts . . . would have been far less frequent under a probable cause
standard”).
317
For a contrary view, see Laurin, supra note 29, at 12.
318
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 333, 363 (1998) (linking weak Fourth Amendment doctrine to racial profiling).
319
See Darrell D. Jackson, Profiling the Police: Flipping 20 Years of Whren
on Its Head, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 671, 696 (2017) (suggesting Whren supports profiling by police officers).
320
Meares, supra note 4, at 169.
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of Freedom in 2003.321 However, as Wilson’s long-time colleague
Glenn C. Loury noted, Wilson’s work “provide[d] academic justification for” hyper-incarceration in general and programmatic stop
and frisk in particular.322
In multiple publications, Wilson argued that blacks were crime
prone. In Crime and Human Nature, which he co-wrote with Richard Herrnstein, Wilson does not quite say that blacks are biologically crime prone; he just says that blacks are more likely to have a
certain body type, and that that body type is crime prone.323 In his
book chapter, Crime, published in a conservative think tank’s anthology on race, Wilson contended that being from a single-parent
family, which is significantly more likely among blacks, made one
crime prone.324 In the famous essay on policing called Broken Windows, Wilson, with George L. Kelling, blended a nurture argument
about lower-class people not following mainstream social norms
with an implicit nature argument that blacks were predisposed to be
over-represented amongst those groups.325 Be it by nature or nurture, Wilson consistently saw blacks as crime prone.
Wilson’s nature mode was evident in Crime and Human Nature
where he associated certain body types with criminality.326 He disfavored large men and associated that body type with black and
Latinx people.327 Wilson’s rationalization of treating large black
321

Loury, supra note 21, at 48.
Id. at 48, 50; see also Zimring, supra note 21, at 831–32 (“A reader can
make the long journey from scholarship to salesmanship and back in the space of
a single Wilsonian paragraph.”).
323
JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 69–90 (1985); see also SHAUN L. GABBIDON & HELEN TAYLOR GREENE,
RACE AND CRIME 61–98 (2d ed. 2009) (summarizing theories that racial minorities, especially blacks, are more crime-prone).
324
James Q. Wilson, Crime, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 115, 120–22 (Abigail Thernstrom &
Stephan Thernstrom eds., 2002).
325
See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 22.
326
See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 323, at 69–90.
327
“[C]riminals on the average differ in physique from the population at large.
They tend to be mesomorphic (muscular) and less ectomorphic (linear), with the
third component (endomorphy) not clearly deviating from normal. Where it has
been assessed, the ‘masculine’ configuration called andromorphy also characterized the average criminal.” Id. at 89. “Among whites, being a mesomorph is an
indicator of a predisposition to crime. Young black males are more mesomorphic . . . than are young white males . . . .” Id. at 469; see also THOMAS L. DUMM,
322
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men as criminogenic is not new,328 but it adds fuel to the fire of racial stereotypes. In fact, a recent study found that police officers
continue to be hyper-suspicious of such men.329 Note as well that
Wilson’s co-author in Crime and Human Nature is a confirmed biological racist and the author of the infamous book, The Bell Curve:
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life,330 which cites
Nazi scientists for the proposition that certain races are genetically
inferior.331 Loury also recalls that Wilson was silent in the face of
racist proclamations of biological inferiority.332
In nurture mode, Wilson opens his book chapter Crime with
these words: “A central problem—perhaps the central problem—in
improving the relationship between white and black Americans is
the difference in racial crime rates.”333 Was Wilson claiming that the
misbehaviors of a small percentage of black people justify white
people in being racist toward all black people? Seemingly, yes.
Seemingly because he thought black culture promotes crime.
For instance, in Crime, Wilson goes on to contend that blacks
commit more crime than whites, which he says is because blacks
have many more children out of wedlock than whites.334 The higher
crime rate among blacks, according to Wilson, is why whites fear
blacks, refuse to live with them or send their kids to school with
them, and support aggressive policing of them.335 He declares, “[o]f
UNITED STATES 101–04 (William E. Connolly ed., 1994) (critiquing the racism
behind Wilson and Herrnsteins’ argument).
328
See, e.g., WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 323, at 69–90 (discussing
previous studies comparing body type with criminality).
329
Adrienne N. Milner et al., Black and Hispanic Men Perceived to Be Large
Are at Increased Risk for Police Frisk, Search, and Force, PLOS ONE, Mar. 11,
2015, at 1, 5–9, http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.
0147158 (“Results indicated that for most height and weight categories, black and
Hispanic suspects were at increased risk of being frisked or searched compared to
their white counterparts even when controlling for the circumstances of the
stop.”).
330
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1996).
331
See Charles Lane, The Tainted Sources of ‘The Bell Curve,’ N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Dec. 1, 1994, at 14, 14–19.
332
See Loury, supra note 21, at 49.
333
Wilson, supra note 324, at 115.
334
Id. at 120–22.
335
Id. at 118.

2018]

THE GENEALOGY OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK

61

course whites avoid blacks; of course police officers stop and question blacks. What can you expect?”336 This attitude would explain
white support for putting black communities “under lock and
key.”337
In that light, we can see Wilson’s perspectives on criminology
as part of the backlash against the black civil rights movement of the
1960s. Loury notes that Wilson was greatly influenced psychologically by the movement to critique the liberalism of the 1960s.338 Perhaps that is why Wilson held on to his 1970s views rationalizing
hyper-incarceration into the 2000s, despite the mounting evidence
that it was unjustifiably race-based339 and tremendously harmful to
racial minority communities.340 Even the relatively conservative
scholar Franklin Zimring found Wilson unpersuasive because of
Wilson’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge change. 341 Wilson’s need
to revolt against 1960s liberalism seems to have animated his backlash version of criminology.
The result of backlash criminology was an assumption that overpolicing of young racial minorities was an expected and acceptable
cost of aggressive policing. It is thus unsurprising that Meares understands Wilson to have endorsed programmatic stop and frisk. “It
is critical to understand,” says Meares, that what Wilson sought
“[was] a program.”342 According to Meares, Wilson’s criminology
supports the view that “good policing is articulated from the top
336

Id.
HAYES, supra note 246, at 32.
338
See Loury, supra note 21, at 48–49 (connecting Wilson to like scholars).
339
See Justin Peters, Loose Cigarettes Today, Civil Unrest Tomorrow: The
Racist, Classist Origins of Broken Windows Policing, SLATE (Dec. 5, 2014, 6:37
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2014/12/edward_b
anfield_the_racist_classist_origins_of_broken_windows_policing.html (“In their
Atlantic article, Kelling and Wilson recognized the racial implications of order
policing. ‘How do we ensure, in short, that the police do not become the agents of
neighborhood bigotry?’ they asked, before essentially shrugging and moving on.
‘We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question.’”).
340
See Loury, supra note 21, at 48–50 (decrying Wilson having “stubbornly
reiterated” debunked ideas).
341
See Zimring, supra note 21, at 831–32 (criticizing Wilson’s downplaying
of the conservative turn in criminal justice policy from the mid-1970s to mid1990s as well as his unsubstantiated claim that mass incarceration prevented crime
during that period).
342
Meares, supra note 4, at 168.
337
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down throughout the entire agency to include aggressive, systematic, ‘legalistic’ field interrogations designed to suppress crime.”343
One can certainly say that Wilson and Kellings’s Broken Windows
theory was meant to get a certain population, the kind that was expected to offend, to behave by harassing it over petty crimes such as
selling single cigarettes without a license—the cause of Eric Garner’s death.344
To emphasize that Wilson, who often co-authored works, was
not a lone wolf, let us consider one other example of backlash criminology. The bad guy in this tale is Princeton political science professor John DiIulio, who coined the term “super-predator.”345
Shortly before President George W. Bush awarded Wilson the Presidential Medal of Freedom, he appointed DiIulio as his head of faithbased initiatives.346 DiIulio’s theory was that black neighborhoods
were raising children “surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings.”347 This description of a coming generation of superpredators became a national phenomenon referenced on the covers
of popular magazines.348 That thesis was thoroughly disproven, as
crime went down in the next generation.349 Nevertheless, the image
of young men of color as paradigmatic criminals remained.350

343

Id. at 168–69. Meares later defines “legalistic” policing as concentrating
“on issuing many citations and questioning disorderly people at high rates in order
to reduce the overall crime rate.” Id. at 171.
344
See Ronald Wheeler, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Law Librarianship, 107 L. LIBR. J. 467, 467–68 (2015) (describing police killing of Eric Garner
in investigation for selling loose cigarettes); see also TAIBBI, supra note 1, at 112–
15, 118–22 (detailing the police killing of Eric Garner under order-maintenance
policing).
345
See John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY.
STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23.
346
See D. MICHAEL LINDSAY, FAITH IN THE HALLS OF POWER: HOW EVANGELICALS JOINED THE AMERICAN ELITE 50 (2007). Although DiIulio was supposedly a “life-long Democrat” to that point, he was also “a self-described ‘bornagain Catholic.’” Id. at 49 (emphasis in original).
347
DiIulio, supra note 345, at 25.
348
Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black
Males in America, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 281, 296–97 (2012).
349
See id. at 297.
350
Id. at 297–300 (discussing public concern over “super-predators” between
the 1990s and early 2000s).
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Scholars have demonstrated that police assumptions that racial
minorities are crime prone are stoked by a conservative machinery
seeking to sway public opinion toward racial profiling. Conservative
foundations, scholars, Fox television commentators, and Paul Ryan
(Speaker of the United States House of Representatives from October 2015 to January 2019) all promote the belief that blacks are necessarily crime prone because they marry less frequently.351 This
grossly simplifies the causes of crime, making such theories “highly
intentionally dishonest.”352
Treatment of young black and Latinx men is related to cultural
discourses about their criminogenic nature. For example, calls for
law and order and the accompanying backlash theories of criminology led to the Wars on Crime and Drugs353 and, in turn, helped make
young black males the paradigmatic criminal in the popular imagination.354 This caused a cultural shift at the end of the twentieth century that broke the century-long view that when dealing with juveniles, the criminal justice system’s prime directive should be rehabilitation, not punishment.355
C. Micro Level: From Theory to Policy
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK IN
NEW YORK CITY
When conservative criminologists Kelling and Wilson created
Broken Windows theory in 1982, they linked conservative ideologies at the macro level to the permissiveness of Terry doctrine at the
meso level, thereby rationalizing a set of aggressive policing practices at the micro level. Kelling and Wilson’s theory analogizes lowlevel offenses to broken windows in a neighborhood.356 Broken windows are assumed to encourage more serious crimes by suggesting
351
See Garrison, supra note 24, at 129–33; see also Lauren Fox et al., House
Speaker Paul Ryan Won't Seek Re-Election: ‘I Like to Think I've Done My Part,’
CNN (Apr. 11, 2018, 1:43 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/11/politics/paulryan-retirement-house-speaker/index.html.
352
Garrison, supra note 24, at 134–35.
353
See ALEXANDER, supra note 247, at 5 (connecting the Wars on Crime and
Drugs to preservation through transformation of racial hierarchy).
354
Moriearty & Carson, supra note 348, at 295–96.
355
See id. at 294.
356
See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 22.
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that no one cares about rule breaking.357 Adherents of Broken Windows theory developed the meso-level public policy of “order
maintenance” policing.358 Order-maintenance policing, sometimes
known as “quality of life” or “zero tolerance” policing,359 involves
arresting people for petty offenses.360 Previously ignored de minimis
offenses, such as jumping turnstiles to gain free rides on public
transit or littering, are approved bases for order-maintenance arrests.361 The stated goal of Broken Windows policing is to improve
everyone’s quality of life by preserving order.362 In reality, Broken
Windows policing appears to accomplish that goal mostly from the
point of view of affluent whites.363
With the conservative criminological theory of Broken Windows and order-maintenance policing in place, all programmatic
stop and frisk needed was a catalyst. It received this catalyst when a
crime wave instigated calls for law and order by any means necessary. The stage for movement toward programmatic stop and frisk
practices was set in the early 1990s, when a spike in violent crime
357
Id.; see also Tanya Erzen, Turnstile Jumpers and Broken Windows: Policing Disorder in New York City, in ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE
NEW POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY 19, 20 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya
Erzen eds., 2001) [hereinafter ZERO TOLERANCE] (“Kelling and Wilson believe
that an area that appears disorderly implicitly sanctions more serious crimes.”).
358
Bellin, supra note 4, at 1504 (stating that “‘order maintenance policies
[were] designed to implement [Broken Windows]”).
359
Andrea McArdle, Introduction, in ZERO TOLERANCE, supra note 357, at 1,
4–5.
360
Bellin, supra note 4, at 1504.
361
Id.; see Erzen, supra note 357, at 19.
362
See Erzen, supra note 357, at 19–21.
363
See Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s “Seesaw Effect,” 56 OKLA. L. REV. 833, 865–68 (2003) (postulating that crime’s movement
into white areas during the Dinkins Mayoral years in New York City caused calls
for aggressive policing), as reprinted in SEARCH AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND C ONTEMPORARY D EBATE (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011). For
further background on order-maintenance policing, see, for example, Fagan &
Davies, supra note 37, at 461–63; K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken
Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 276–80 (2009). In fact, some have said that
all order-maintenance policing seeks to do is to reduce the public perception of
criminality, not to reduce crime itself. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken
Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 291, 305–08 (1998).
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engulfed the United States in general and New York City in particular.364 That allowed conservatives to rationalize aggressive policing
of certain neighborhoods.365
When Republican Mayor Rudy Giuliani took office, New York
City Transit Police Commissioner William Bratton had recently
gained accolades for using the Broken Windows theory to fight
crime.366 Giuliani hired Bratton as the police commissioner.367 Bratton adopted order-maintenance policing,368 but NYPD methods soon
morphed into a gun deterrence theory.369 Aggressive, top-down policing aimed at deterring gun use, especially when targeted at racial
minorities, is basically programmatic stop and frisk.370
The discourse surrounding Kelling and Wilson’s Broken Windows theory is acknowledged to have been enormously influential
in policing circles.371 NYPD Commissioner Bratton is known to
have adapted his policing theories from the order-maintenance policing methodologies, which are themselves a product of Broken
Windows theory.372 The eventual NYPD methods—which blended
administrative dictations of pervasive, profile-based stops and frisks
targeted at young black and Latinx men in order to confiscate their
364

See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1503–07, 1507 n.54.
See id. at 1503–07.
366
Id. at 1503–04.
367
Id. at 1503.
368
Id. at 1503–04.
369
See id. at 1504–05; see also Fagan & Davies, supra note 37, at 471–72.
370
See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1504–05 (contrasting programmatic stop and
frisk from order maintenance). Bellin is correct about the distinctness, but inadequately emphasizes that Broken Windows theory and order-maintenance methodologies were a historically significant and necessary precursor to programmatic
stop and frisk. Id. In New York City, programmatic stop and frisk developed out
of a desire to expand from the goal of order maintenance into violent crime reduction by taking guns away from civilians presumed likely to offend. See id. at
1503–04. While it is not the same as order maintenance, programmatic stop and
frisk developed out of Broken Windows theory and order-maintenance methodologies.
371
See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
271, 272–75 (2006) (reporting results of study debunking Broken Windows theory’s efficacy, but acknowledging “[t]he ‘broken windows’ theory produced what
many observers have called a revolution in policing and law enforcement”).
372
For a historical account of programmatic stop and frisk, see Bellin, supra
note 4, at 1500–20.
365
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guns (programmatic stop and frisk)—are a natural extension of Broken Windows theory.373 So, responsibility for programmatic stop
and frisk can easily be laid in the lap of backlash criminology.
2. LINKING BACKLASH CRIMINOLOGY TO PROGRAMMATIC
STOP AND FRISK AND SOCIAL MARGINALIZATION OF BLACK
AND LATINX MEN
Having seen how backlash criminology was translated into policy, we are better able to see its connections to the social marginalization of black men. A prominent example is the way theories like
DiIulio’s helped fuel the school-to-prison pipeline. Rios notes that
“[i]f institutions of social control believe that all young people follow the ‘code of the street’ or that defiant or delinquent poor, urban
youth of color are ‘superpredators’. . . then policies, programs, and
interactions with marginalized youths will be based on this false information.”374 This Section of the Article demonstrates how backlash criminology leads to social marginalization of young black and
Latinx men.
Discourse has played a central role in the social marginalization
of young black and Latinx males. Narratives that hypercriminalize
young black and Latinx boys dominate media coverage of these
groups. Rios reveals a truth about the media coverage of hypercriminalization: “the perspectives of social-control agents [are] commonly represented in the media and institutional discourses and
practices,” while youths’ experiences are rarely conveyed.375 Just as
local news generally smuggles implicit biases into its watchers’
minds, the media normalizes the specific idea that young black and
Latinx men are crime prone.376 Media discourses are thus a prime

373

See id. at 1509 (noting the NYPD’s adoption of James Q. Wilson’s theory
that stop and frisk should be used to remove guns from potential violent offenders).
374
RIOS, supra note 114, at 9–10; see also WILLIAM G. STAPLES, EVERYDAY
SURVEILLANCE: VIGILANCE AND VISIBILITY IN POSTMODERN LIFE 3 (2000) (stating “the intent of social control is to mold, shape and modify actions and behaviors”).
375
RIOS, supra note 114, at 9.
376
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489,
1551, 1553–54 (2005) (considering local news a kind of virus transmitting prejudices).
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machinery by which young black and Latinx men are hypercriminalized.
In socially marginalizing young men of color, programmatic
stop and frisk does what it was designed to do. It was born of the
Terry Court’s refusal (under a claim of inability) to prevent use of
stops and frisks for racial harassment.377 The discourse of backlash
criminology meant that programmatic stop and frisk gradually became the tool recommended by leading scholars of crime prevention.378 Those scholars may have endorsed programmatic stop and
frisk’s tendency toward racial profiling because they were motivated
by a desire to respond to what they saw as the excessive liberalism
of the Great Society/Civil Rights era.379 The result of backlash criminology and programmatic stop and frisk is social marginalization
of young men of color.380
But what can we do?
IV. EXAMPLE OF A COUNTER-DISCOURSE:
AGAINST UNEDUCATED GUESSES
The preceding genealogy of programmatic stop and frisk is an
intervention into the common practice of criminal procedure scholarship. We have mostly focused on judicial doctrines and police
practices without linking them to society-wide ideological discourses. We must make that connection because discourses drive
practices. This genealogy of programmatic stop and frisk shows that
discourses calling for law and order as a backlash to civil rights
drove the desire to create doctrinal discourses justifying police racial
harassment.381 The criminology of backlash then fueled the policing
377

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1968) (contending racial harassment
non-deterrable); Bellin, supra note 4, at 1502. But see, e.g., David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus
Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 984–85
(1998) (criticizing Court’s acquiescence to racial harassment via Terry stop).
378
See supra Section III.C.2. (detailing link between backlash criminology
and programmatic stop and frisk).
379
See, e.g., Loury, supra note 21, at 49.
380
There is a long history of marginalization of black men. See generally
Bryan Stevenson, A Presumption of Guilt: The Legacy of America’s History of
Racial Injustice, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN, supra note 2, at 3–30. Programmatic stop and frisk is merely a more recent mean.
381
See Loury, supra note 21, at 49.
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method of programmatic stop and frisk.382 Accordingly, we must
understand discourses to understand practices.
Considering how macro-level discourses influence police practices shows us that we cannot challenge calls for law and order by
means of programmatic stop and frisk if we accept, as some do, the
idea that racial hierarchy is inevitable.383 Such broad discourses
about cultural deficiencies can lead people to conclude that it is acceptable for police officers to harass young racial minority men.384
Consequently, scholars concerned about police racial harassment
cannot just seek to reform policing at the micro level; we must create
counter-narratives at both the macro and meso levels to make equality a priority in policing. Only then can we proceed to connect those
ideas to revising judicial doctrines and police practices.
Positive change could be promoted by one of three types of responses. First, we could resist at the macro level by challenging cultural narratives that rationalize programmatic stop and frisk. Second,
we could fight back at the meso level by attacking the legal doctrines
(themselves often prompted by discourses about crime policy) that
enable racial targeting. Finally, we could advocate for change at the
micro level by proposing policies that would alter police officer behavior. This Article endorses an all-levels response, but the remainder concentrates on an example from the meso level: legal discourse
about the Whren doctrine.
A. Addressing the Discourses Behind Programmatic Stop and
Frisk
At the macro level, we must insist on substantive equality as the
proper grounding for our society. The focus of a macro-level response would be on the cultural reasons why the populace should
withdraw its support for programmatic stop and frisk. The goal
would be to confront white fear and post-civil rights anxiety in order
to turn the majority away from tacitly assenting to policing focused
on racial harassment. A simple statement of this argument would be
382

Id. at 49–50.
See supra Section II.B.1.
384
See Garrison, supra note 24, at 67 (concluding that by “placing the stopand-frisk policy in context with a historical and social perception within the
United States that black males are more criminogenic than other people, and thus,
it is to be expected that they are disproportionately arrested and incarcerated”).
383
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to say that police racial targeting is morally wrong.385 Significant
political work would have to be done to turn a large swath of the
population against programmatic stop and frisk.
At the meso level, progressive reform would require undoing the
mischief of backlash criminology. The point here is that there is an
ongoing fight over what is appropriate policing that is currently occurring at the meso level of discourse.386 Again, what we think we
know about crime affects what we do about crime.387 That is why
the criminology of backlash is so important. It yielded programmatic
stop and frisk because it won the clash of discourses about policing
policy at the meso level.
To accomplish change in meso-level discourses about policing
policy, we also need to change legal scholarship by attempting to
influence both discourses and doctrine on policing policy. We will
need a vigorous and effective scholarly response to the reemergence
of the law and order narrative in the form of support for programmatic stop and frisk.
Current criminal procedure scholarship seems somewhat equivocal on the question of whether police officers need to have a right
to conduct programmatic stop and frisk. Even some scholars who
are critical of programmatic stop and frisk’s racial targeting nonetheless seem to accept former NYPD commissioner Bratton’s
worldview that “[s]top-and-frisk is not something you can stop. It is
an absolutely basic tool of American policing.”388
Consider Meares’s statement on the link between James Q. Wilson’s theories and racial profiling:
Of course, when police engage in this kind of policing it is inevitable—at least without randomization—
that certain groups will have more contact with police than will other groups. James Q. Wilson himself
385
See, e.g., Goel et al., supra note 6, at 221 (clarifying that “an interest in
general deterrence or sending a message cannot justify a Terry stop in the absence
of particularized suspicion. . . . [A] desire to demonstrate the power and authority
of the police is a dubious objective for stop-and-frisk”).
386
See, e.g., Loury, supra note 21, at 49.
387
See Hall, supra note 13, at 44.
388
David Feith, William Bratton: The Real Cures for Gun Violence, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424127887323968304578246721614388346 (quoting Bratton).

70

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

acknowledged the antagonistic potential of his strategy in a journalistic version of his argument,
called Just Take Away Their Guns. He wrote there,
“Young black and Hispanic men will probably be
stopped more often than older white Anglo males or
women of any race.”389
This statement is tricky because it aims solely to show that Wilson
endorsed programmatic stop and frisk, including its racially disparate impact. But Meares’s own claim that racial disparity is “inevitable” is troubling.390 Such statements could be used to rationalize racial profiling.
Likewise, scholarly statements implicitly endorsing preordained
and/or pretextual intrusions are not rare. For instance, Professor
Barry Friedman and attorney Cynthia Benin Stein say “the very nature of policing has shifted from a reactive crime-solving model towards intelligence-gathering, regulation, and deterrence. ‘Cause,’
once the sine qua non of policing, makes little sense in this deterrent
context.”391 That statement puts forth the very controversial idea that
particularized suspicion—long the heart of Fourth Amendment doctrine—is now irrelevant in most cases.392
In a similar vein, Meares seems to accept the idea of pretextual
searches. “Ideally,” says Meares, “an officer will keep an eye on the
person who exhibits enough suspicious characteristics and wait until
that person engages in some kind of activity that justifies the officer’s interference.”393 This statement accepts the Whren doctrine’s
implication that almost any police intrusion upon civilians is automatically constitutional if there is also probable cause that any of-

389
Meares, supra note 4, at 169 (quoting James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away
Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar 20, 1994, at 46, 47).
390
Id.
391
Friedman & Stein, supra note 4, at 285.
392
See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 392–93 (1988) (accusing
Court of having drastically altered Fourth Amendment by watering down particularized suspicion requirement).
393
Meares, supra note 4, at 169. Meares is somewhat critical of this result,
noting this “comes very close to the constitutional line.” Id.
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fense was committed, regardless of the officer’s admitted impermissible motive.394 The Whren decision is regarded as enabling most
police racial profiling,395 as most officers can eventually catch any
civilian looking like they might be committing some offense.396
What officers sometimes do, therefore, is pick a suspect because
they are a young racial minority male, then come up with a de minimis offense that justifies whatever seizure and search they would
like to make.397
Scholarly statements supporting programmatic stop and frisk
might be valuable if they are neutral assessments of the practice.
Still, such statements might be dangerous in reactionary times.
What we need now is a new macro- and meso-level set of discourses establishing equality as a central principle of policing. Responding to renewed law and order discourses will be an important
part of getting civilians to withdraw their consent from aggressive,
race-based policing. We must continuously engage in that war over
the long haul. In the meantime, we should argue that police should
not just be making us feel safe, they should be making us feel like
equal citizens. For instance, what if we thought civilians had an inherent right to be treated respectfully by the police, even when they
challenged the officer’s authority or decisions?398 Such a right of
394

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (dismissing the notion that “the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total
compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible”); see also Profiling
in America, supra note 245, at 1075 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has effectively
authorized racial profiling in law enforcement. The Court’s decisions, thus, are in
no small part responsible for the fact that race dominated much of modern U.S.
law enforcement.”).
395
Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional:
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 882, 884, 884 n.2 (2015).
396
See, e.g., Shea Denning, Traffic Violations You May Not Even Know You
Are Committing, U.N.C. SCH. GOV’T: N.C. CRIM. L. (Apr. 29, 2014, 2:55 PM),
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/traffic-violations-you-may-not-even-knowyou-are-committing/ (naming common violations).
397
See, e.g., Timothy P. O’Neill, Vagrants in Volvos: Ending Pretextual Traffic Stops and Consent Searches of Vehicles in Illinois, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 745,
750 (2009) (referring to ubiquitous use of “minor offenses” as a “legal ‘foot in the
door’ for police officers to ask questions, use drug-sniffing dogs, or ask consent
to search”).
398
See Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 551
(2015) (seeking a “republican” form of policing wherein “community policing”
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protest would make explicit the idea that police officers ought to
treat all civilians as equals.
B. Example: Recharacterizing Whren
This Article has made the argument that scholars have not adequately appreciated the discursive roots of programmatic stop and
frisk. The last Section thus argued for scholarly creation of macroand meso-level narratives making equality the primary mission of
policing. Without delving too deeply into a topic worthy of a full
article of its own, we can say that at the meso level we need to revise
legal doctrines that enable programmatic stop and frisk. For instance, legal scholar Gabriel J. Chin and attorney Charles J. Vernon
have done admirable work in suggesting that Whren itself can and
should be overturned.399
This Article challenges the fact that courts often apply the Whren
pretext rule to stops and frisks by providing a counter discourse at
the meso level. The extension of Whren into Terry might be termed
“pretext-creep.”400 As part of challenging racially targeted policing,
we must advocate for nothing less than barring application of the
Whren rule to programmatic stops and frisks.
While a full analysis of Whren doctrine is beyond the scope of
this method-oriented piece, halting pretext-creep will involve creating a counter-discourse that explains why Whren should not apply
to programmatic stop and frisk. Two potential arguments are obvi-

would mean “the police were to consult with residents, community members, and
civic organizations to develop policing priorities” (internal citations omitted)).
399
See Chin & Vernon, supra note 395 (arguing for overturning the Whren
decision).
400
The following federal courts have extended Whren to Terry stops: United
States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507–11 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gomez
Serena, 368 F. 3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Saucedo, 226 F.3d
782, 789 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104–05
(9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Williams, 106 F.3d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir.
1997). The following state courts have extended Whren to Terry stops: People v.
Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 641–42 (N.Y. 2001); State v. Akuba, 686 N.W.2d
406, 415 (S.D. 2004); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tenn. 1997). Two
states clearly reject pretext doctrine in Terry stops: State v. Gonzales, 257 P.3d
894, 897 (N.M. 2011); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 839–40 (Wash. 1999).
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ous. First, scholars should emphasize that the original Whren opinion explicitly excludes Terry stops from its ambit.401 Second, scholars should point to the lack of truly particularized suspicion in programmatic stops and frisks as making them especially distinct from
the intrusions anticipated in the Whren decision.402 But those arguments get into the nitty gritty of pretext doctrine without changing
its basic premises.
What we need is a counter-discourse that makes the fact that
Whren involved educated guesses the center of the opinion. We can
make that argument by pointing out that Whren considered its intrusion to be based on probable cause.403 Very early in its analysis, the
Court highlighted the fact that “Petitioners accept[ed] that Officer
Soto had probable cause.”404 As in many traffic cases, the petitioners
had no basis to contest probable cause: the police asserted they saw
the petitioners break a traffic law.405 It matters that the undercover
401

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (explaining away prior
Court statements criticizing pretextual policing).
402
See, e.g., Chin & Vernon, supra note 395, at 884–87 (contending “the rationale for Whren's immunization of racial discrimination has collapsed. The
Court has recently offered additional explanations for the objective approach, creating an opportunity to scrutinize the reasons for the rule, and therefore how far it
should extend”); Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks:
The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 781–82 (2010) (arguing that “a narrow reading
of Whren and its ilk—as foreclosing consideration of police motives in ruling on
Fourth Amendment challenges—is not inconsistent with taking into account an
officer's knowledge and beliefs, either in assessing probable cause or in evaluating
the reasonableness of a Terry frisk”).
403
See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
404
Id.
405
The “reasonableness” of the stop could certainly be questioned, for the offense is described as follows: “The truck remained stopped at the intersection for
what seemed an unusually long time—more than 20 seconds. When the police car
executed a U-turn in order to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned
suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.”
Id. at 808. The phenomenon of “testilying” complicates allegations of probable
cause. See, e.g., Larry Cunningham, Taking on Testilying: The Prosecutor’s Response to In-Court Police Deception, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 26, 26–27 (1999)
(“When an officer is deceptive in court, the rationale goes, he is ‘not quite lying’
but ‘not quite testifying truthfully and completely’ either. Testilying is seen as a
middle ground between pure honesty and pure dishonesty. Officers feel that they
can tread ethically within this middle ground because they feel that they have society’s best interests at heart: the conviction of the guilty.”).
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vice officers in Whren had the suspects dead-to-rights, as it shows
they were not just guessing as to the existence of an offense.406
We must next remember that probable cause was once credibly
thought to require something akin to “more likely than not.”407 As
an intuitive, and perhaps insightful, 2017 commenter on EvidenceProf Blog said, “[t]he meaning of the word ‘probable’ itself is
‘likely to occur or prove true.’”408 The commenter then provocatively noted, “The [Fourth] Amendment of the Constitution sets the
standard of ‘probable cause,’ and what gives us the right to change
the meaning of the word ‘probable’ to include ‘probably not’?”409
Moreover, law professor Ronald Bacigal contended that, as late as
2005, whether probable cause requires a 50.1% probability was “arguably unsettled.”410 In Whren, the officers had more than a
“hunch,” more than “specific and articulable facts” (reasonable suspicion), and even more than a “fair probability” (probable cause).411
The conservative Court that emerged in the wake of Presidents
Nixon and Reagan eventually defined probable cause as “a fair probability.”412 Such a probability is based on common sense and “is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages.”413
Moreover, according to then-Justice Rehnquist, probable cause is
“not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”414
This last statement may have led legal scholar Ric Simmons to assert
406
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(discussing standard of proof for Michael Brown’s family’s suit of his slayer, officer Darren Wilson). Accord Fagan, supra note 304, at 52–53 (quoting Stuntz,
supra note 304, at 1362).
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Beast of Burden, supra note 408. The commenter does conclude that one
could resolve the difficulty by saying that probable cause means that some reasonable person could conclude it was more likely than not the suspect was involved in a crime, even though that might not establish a 50.1% probability. Id.
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that the probable cause standard has “been intentionally kept vague
by the courts.”415
While probable cause can be established with less than a preponderance of the evidence, it is always at least an educated guess.416 In
light of the natural reading of probable cause as more likely than
not, probable cause seems to require at least something close to a
fifty percent (50%) chance.417 Bacigal convincingly labels “[f]air
probability,” or probable cause, as ranging between a forty to fortynine percent (40% to 49%) chance.418
In contrast, reasonable suspicions are really just uneducated
guesses.419 Bacigal thus pins specific and articulable facts, or “reasonable suspicion,” at no higher than a forty percent (40%) chance
and as low as a twenty percent (20%) probability.420
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has said that the reasonable
suspicion standard, which applies to Terry stops, is lower than probable cause. In Alabama v. White, the Court quoted United States v.
Sokolow in specifying that reasonable suspicion is “considerably
less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”421 The Court then went on to create a significant gap between probable cause and reasonable suspicion:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard
than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information
that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the
sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.422
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So, probable cause not only requires a greater quantum of evidence,
but it is also qualitatively distinct in that more reliable evidence must
be adduced to support it.
The strong version of what probable cause requires makes sense
in light of the Whren decision. The Whren Court said, “[w]here
probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found
it necessary actually to perform the ‘balancing’ analysis involved
searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner.”423 In
non-extraordinary intrusions, which include stops and frisks, probable cause stands as a distinct guarantor of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Although many lower courts have extended the Whren pretext
rule to stops and frisks,424 probable cause should be understood to
warrant that treatment only because it is an educated guess. This is
justified by the fact that probable cause should also be understood
as akin to “more likely than not” and as both quantitatively and qualitatively different from reasonable suspicion. That reversal of the
lower courts’ views would accomplish a meso-level reworking of
the current doctrinal discourse.
While some might argue that whatever applies to probable cause
should apply to reasonable suspicion, such an argument contradicts
the seriousness of the probable cause standard. Remembering that
the Terry Court itself declared that stops and frisks are no mere
“petty indignit[ies],”425 police cannot be excused from establishing
the probable cause that existed in Whren on grounds that stops and
frisks are de minimis. Rather, stops and frisks are serious intrusions
that are exempted from the usual requirements.426 If we take the language in Whren seriously, it was the existence of probable cause that
made a consideration of pretext unnecessary in that case. Hence, the
Court distinguished cases involving pretext precisely because “[i]n
each case [the Court] address[ed] the validity of a search conducted
in the absence of probable cause.”427 The Court’s elaboration upon
423
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its statement—that administrative searches only get a reduced standard because of their “purpose”—reinforces the idea that probable
cause is different.428 If we may consider the purpose of the search
when it is administrative in nature but not for the “run-of-the-mine”
case, it must be because “run-of-the-mine” cases are supported by
probable cause.429 Hence, our meso-level response to pretext doctrine is to point out that its own terms prevent its extension to uneducated guesses, such as stops and frisks. At a minimum, though, pretext-creep should be frowned upon because it inoculates uneducated
guesses.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that fixing programmatic stop and frisk
requires dismantling the discursive supports for social control of
young black and Latinx men. The discourse-to-practice-circuit
helps us understand why police departments developed data-driven,
aggressive profiling of young men of color in the name of crime
prevention. Two contradictory facts yield concern and hope. First,
the white majority is currently tacitly assenting to hyperpolicing of
racial minority communities.430 Second, many whites want to be
egalitarian.431 The genealogy of programmatic stop and frisk shows
why we ought to be concerned that aggressive policing of young
black and Latinx men will continue.432 Nonetheless, we should be
hopeful that bedrock American values will prevail, and programmatic stop and frisk will eventually be eliminated.433
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